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ABSTRACT
In both law and public scrutiny, renewed attention is being given to
the simple act of casting a ballot. At a time when the formal act of
voting has been relaxed, and more than a third of Americans cast
their ballots in a manner other than voting at the polls on Election
Day, there is a decided pushback. In some sense this is hardly novel;
questions of ballot integrity and ballot access have been recurring
issues in the United States from Reconstruction to the Civil Rights
Era. In both of these previous eras, enfranchisement and
disenfranchisement had a partisan edge, but were understood to be
battles over the black franchise—and properly so. Whether that
remains the case is the subject of this Article.
The inquiry begins with the partisan implications of turnout and
focuses primarily on the partisan dimension of new efforts at ballot
restriction. This Article contends that although issues of the franchise
correlate with race, as does the partisan divide between Democrats
and Republicans, the new battles over ballot access do not readily
lend themselves to a narrative that focuses primarily on racial
exclusion. Rather, they point to a deep vulnerability of American
democracy in entrusting election administration and election
eligibility to local partisan control.
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INTRODUCTION
Every four years, election coverage focuses heavily on an elusive
band of Americans thought to inhabit remote parts of the country.
This mysterious group is usually termed the “undecided voters” (or
occasionally the “independent voters”), whose lack of partisan
affiliation and firm convictions is deemed to forecast how the
oscillating center of the American political spectrum is going to tip
the election. This otherwise unknown and unseen group then gathers
briefly in its preferred habitat: the tightly orchestrated focus-group
room of a television network. Some Americans, looking for a break
from campaign attack advertisements, actually watch the
deliberations of the uncertain, indulging themselves with only an
occasional snicker, while thinking, “who are these people?” Even for
those who want to see how people on the eve of a presidential
election could in fact remain undecided, what remains unaddressed is
whether the preferences of this small vacillating group are actually
going to decide the election.
An alternative hypothesis would have it that this group of
undecideds is not only hard to find in the real world, but also not a
meaningful barometer for election forecasting. Instead, it may be that
elections are not won and lost primarily in the minds of this elusive
group of the undecided, but instead, following the political wisdom of
1
Woody Allen, that 80 percent of success is just showing up. On this
view, the bulk of the electorate has reasonably fixed political
preferences that are unlikely to shift in the waning hours of the neverending election cycle. Consider that President Barack Obama won
handily in 2008 and 2012 with more than half of the popular vote and
2
well in excess of 60 percent of the Electoral College vote. Yet in
1. See Lynn Vavreck, The Myth of Swing Voters in Midterm Elections, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/23/upshot/the-myth-of-swing-voters-in-midtermelections.html (defending this thesis). For citation to the Woody Allen quote, see Garson
O’Toole, Showing Up Is 80 Percent of Life, QUOTE INVESTIGATOR (June 10, 2013),
http://quoteinvestigator.com/2013/06/10/showing-up (discussing myriad potential sources and
attributions for the quote typically attributed to Woody Allen).
2. See Presidential Election Popular Votes 1940–2012, ROPER CTR. PUB. OP. ARCHIVES,
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/elections/common/pop_vote.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2015)
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2010, the Republicans won more than half of the national popular
vote and swept the table, gaining control of the U.S. House of
3
Representatives. Following the story of the undecided voters would
indicate that they swung heavily to Obama in 2008, to the
Republicans in 2010, and then back to Obama in 2012—a rather
extraordinary account of political mass migrations.
Although it is possible that such massive shifts took place, a
simpler account is provided by examining the correlation between
turnout and partisan success:

(Obama popular-vote totals); 2008 Electoral College Results, U.S. ARCHIVES, http://www
.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/2008/election-results.html (last visited Mar. 10,
2015) (Obama 2008 Electoral College vote and popular-vote totals; percentages calculated by
author); 2012 Electoral College Results, U.S. ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/federalregister/electoral-college/2012/election-results.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2015) (Obama 2012
Electoral College vote and popular-vote totals; percentages calculated by author).
3. KAREN L. HAAS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, STATISTICS OF THE
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 2, 2010, at 57–60 (June 3, 2011), available at http://
clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/2010election.pdf.
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Table 1. Voter Turnout and Partisan Success
Year

2008
2010
2012

[Vol. 64:1363

4

Turnout
(as % of citizens)

Senate Seats
Gained by
Successful Party

House Seats
Gained by
Successful Party

Successful
Party

5

63.6%

8

24

Democrats

6

45%

6

64

Republicans

7

61.8%

2

8

Democrats

The simpler account is that Democrats seem to do better when
voter turnout is higher, and worse when turnout is lower. Certainly
there is an interactive effect such that the correlation does not
establish causation, but even the simple correlation presented in
Table 1 is noteworthy, and not just to the casual observer. In 2012,
commentators and campaigns alike operated under the assumption
that if the electorate were the same as in 2008, President Obama

4. “Successful party” is defined as the party that gained seats in that election. See
Reported Voting and Registration by Race, Hispanic Origin, Sex, and Age Groups: November
1964
to
2012,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
A1
(Feb.
2012),
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/historical/index.html
(turnout
data pulled from spreadsheet); Election Results, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, http://www.fec.gov/
pubrec/electionresults.shtml (last visited Mar. 10, 2015) (election results for House and Senate).
5. Compare FED. ELECTION COMM’N, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2008: ELECTION RESULTS
FOR THE U.S. PRESIDENT, THE U.S. SENATE AND THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 3
(2009) [hereinafter FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2008], available at http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/
fe2008/federalelections2008.pdf (reporting that after the 2008 general election, fifty-seven
Democrats would serve in the Senate and 257 in the House), with FED. ELECTION COMM’N,
FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2006: ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE U.S. SENATE AND THE U.S. HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES 3 (2007) [hereinafter FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2006], available at
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2006/federalelections2006.pdf (reporting that after the 2006 general
election, forty-nine Democrats would serve in the Senate and 233 in the House).
6. Compare FED. ELECTION COMM’N, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2010: ELECTION RESULTS
FOR THE U.S. SENATE AND THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 3 (2011) [hereinafter
FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2010],
available
at
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2010/federal
elections2010.pdf (reporting that after the 2010 general election, forty-seven Republicans would
serve in the Senate and 242 in the House), with FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2008, supra note 5, at 3
(reporting that after the 2008 general election, forty-one Republicans would serve in the Senate
and 178 in the House).
7. Compare FED. ELECTION COMM’N, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2012: ELECTION RESULTS
FOR THE U.S. SENATE AND THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 3 (2013) [hereinafter
FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2012],
available
at
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2012/federal
elections2012.pdf (reporting that after the 2012 general election, fifty-three Democrats would
serve in the Senate and 201 in the House), with FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2010, supra note 6, at 3
(reporting that after the 2010 general election, fifty-one Democrats would serve in the Senate
and 193 in the House).
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would be reelected, and if it were the same as in 2010, he would be
8
defeated by Mitt Romney.
Understood against the measure of turnout, the well-publicized
meltdown of Karl Rove on national television in response to Obama’s
9
2012 win in Ohio was no send-up. Republicans genuinely believed
they would win—not on the basis of poll numbers disputing the
prediction of the invariably accurate Nate Silver, but on the basis of
turnout projections that substantially underestimated the
effectiveness of the electoral machinery that Obama for America had
10
spent years honing. In many ways, this was simply a variant of the
Democratic incredulity that Republicans could win Ohio in 2004
based on a similar lack of insight into how Republican electoralmachine advances could produce a stunning turnout in Southern
Ohio. Both campaigns understood the centrality of turnout in
electoral battles, and there was a bit of technological leapfrogging as
their campaigns adapted to the changing electoral landscape.
The changed electoral landscape exists across three different
dimensions. Each is a topic unto itself, but I will only posit them here
8. See, e.g., JONATHAN ALTER, THE CENTER HOLDS: OBAMA AND HIS ENEMIES 4 (2013)
(“Only 80 million Americans voted in 2010, compared to 130 million in 2008 . . . . Where were
those missing 50 million voters? They would have to be lured back to the polls if Obama was to
have any chance of re-election.”); Ronald Brownstein, Republicans Can’t Win with White Voters
Alone, THE ATLANTIC, (Sept. 7, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2013/09/republicans-cant-win-with-white-voters-alone/279436 (“Throughout 2012, many
Republicans anticipated that the white proportion of the vote would increase from 2008 and
even quietly based their polling on that assumption; but, ultimately, the white share of the vote
followed the long-term trend and fell to 72 percent—exactly the level that Obama campaign
manager Jim Messina projected early in the year.”); Jan Crawford, Adviser: Romney
“Shellshocked” by Loss, CBSNEWS.COM (Nov. 8, 2012, 5:57 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/
news/adviser-romney-shellshocked-by-loss/2 (“‘They were right,’ a Romney campaign senior
adviser said of the Obama campaign’s assessments [of voter turnout]. ‘And if they were right,
we lose.’”); Karl Rove, Obama’s Shrinking Majority, ROVE.COM (July 12, 2012), http://www
.rove.com/articles/397 (describing Obama’s challenge in no small part as increasing racialminority turnout); William Frey, Minority Turnout Determined the 2012 Election, BROOKINGS
INST. (May 10, 2013), http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/05/10-election-2012minority-voter-turnout-frey (conducting a post-election analysis confirming these predictions).
9. Karl Rove was a live commentator on Fox News during the 2012 count and pointedly
rejected the network’s own early analysis that Obama would win Ohio and with it (in essence)
the Presidency. See Gabriel Sherman, How Karl Rove Fought with Fox News over the Ohio Call,
N.Y. MAG. (Nov. 7, 2012, 12:49 PM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2012/11/how-rovefought-with-fox-over-ohio.html (including a video of the incident).
10. Crawford, supra note 8 (describing the failure of the Romney campaign to grasp
mistakes in internal data); see also Nate Silver, When Internal Polls Mislead, a Whole Campaign
May Be To Blame, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2012, 6:01 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes
.com/2012/12/01/when-internal-polls-mislead-a-whole-campaign-may-be-to-blame
(describing
Romney’s polling failures in further detail).
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and then try to assess the current battles over voter access under the
assumption that these changes are real and important.
First, the parties and the electorate as a whole have become
increasingly polarized. Party polarization is now at its highest levels
11
since Reconstruction: there is currently no overlap in the party
delegations in Congress, meaning that no Republican votes more on
the liberal side than any Democrat, and correspondingly, no
12
Democrat votes more on the conservative side than any Republican.
The electorate has become similarly polarized, with a reduction in
overlapping views across a range of issues, and even in overlapping
13
sources of information.
Modern forms of communication,
particularly cable news outlets and internet sources, allow for sharp
demarcations between what may be thought of as the Fox News and
14
MSNBC demographics. As a result, there are increasingly divided
15
sets of voters choosing from among well-differentiated candidates.
The parties have responded to the hollowing out of the center
and the centrality of turnout by directing their campaigns toward
16
voter mobilization rather than appeals to the median voter, as
predicted by the spatial-market theories of economic theorists Harold
11. See Dylan Matthews, It’s Official: The 112th Congress Was the Most Polarized Ever,
WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/17/itsofficial-the-112th-congress-was-the-most-polarized-ever (examining recent DW-NOMINATE
scores, which are the industry-standard means of measuring ideological polarization).
12. See Drew Desilver, The Polarized Congress of Today Has Its Roots in the 1970s, PEW
RESEARCH CTR. (June 12, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/06/12/polarizedpolitics-in-congress-began-in-the-1970s-and-has-been-getting-worse-ever-since (tracking the
polarization in Congress over time).
13. See generally Political Polarization in the American Public, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (June
12, 2014), http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public
(examining popular polarization).
14. See Amy Mitchell, Jeffrey Gottfried, Jocelyn Kiley & Katerina Eva Mats, Political
Polarization and Media Habits, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.journalism
.org/2014/10/21/political-polarization-media-habits (documenting general trends in media
polarization).
15. For an overview of the literature on the polarization of the electorate, see Richard H.
Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy, Political Fragmentation, and the Decline of American
Government, 124 YALE L.J. 804, 821–24 (2014).
16. See, e.g., Dan Balz, How the Obama Campaign Won the Race for Voter Data, WASH.
POST (July 28, 2103), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/how-the-obama-campaign-wonthe-race-for-voter-data/2013/07/28/ad32c7b4-ee4e-11e2-a1f9-ea873b7e0424_story.html (“‘In the
old days you would say, Here’s a list of people we think are independents, go to those houses,’
[Obama 2012 campaign manager] Messina said. ‘But you waste your volunteers’ time all over
the place because despite what someone says, there are a very small amount of undecided
voters.’ By knowing the voters and modeling the electorate, the campaign wasted less time
pounding the pavement.” (quotation marks omitted)).
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17

Hotelling and Anthony Downs. A mobilization strategy requires
both activist volunteers and money, and both party activists and
donors are more drawn from the ideological poles of the party than is
the typical voter, even the typical voter within each party. Medianvoter theories of parties hewing toward the center assume a stable
electoral base, something that may be true in countries with
18
compulsory voting, such as Australia or Argentina, but not where
turnout may be the critical variable. There is no reason to assume that
strategies aimed at capturing the median point of the overall political
distribution of preferences would be more likely to increase turnout.
In fact, such strategies might be counterproductive in terms of
mobilizing the base.
Second, the legal framework has also been altered. Most notably,
19
the Supreme Court decision in Shelby County v. Holder struck down
the trigger mechanism for Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act
(VRA)—the provision that forces some jurisdictions, primarily in the
former Jim Crow South, to submit proposed voting changes for
administrative preclearance by the Department of Justice (DOJ), or
20
by judicial declaration in the D.C. District Court. With the effective
termination of Section 5, there is a legal path to implementing
restrictions on voter access in states like North Carolina and Texas.
Indeed, of the nine states that were completely covered under Section
21
5, only Virginia is not currently under uniform Republican control.
The termination of Section 5 came at a time when the DOJ was in
Democratic hands and the previously covered states capable of
restricting voter access were, by and large, under Republican
22
control.

17. See Samuel Issacharoff, Collateral Damage: The Endangered Center in American
Politics, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 415, 422 (2004) (discussing the spatial model of political
distributions proposed by Downs, on the basis of work on spatial distribution by Hotelling).
18. See Compulsory Voting, INT’L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE
(Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.idea.int/vt/compulsory_voting.cfm (listing all countries with some
form of compulsory voting, including one obscure Swiss canton).
19. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
20. Id. at 2631.
21. See Kennedy Elliott & Dan Balz, Party Control by State, WASH. POST (Dec. 28, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/national/red-blue (listing states controlled by a
single political party); Jurisdictions Previously Covered by Section 5, VOTING SECTION, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/covered.php (last visited Mar. 10,
2015) (listing covered jurisdictions).
22. Elliott & Balz, supra note 21.
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Third, the single predictor necessary to determine whether a
state will impose voter-access restrictions is whether Republicans
control the ballot-access process. This is not intended as a normative
claim, but simply as a real-world fact of life. Voting restrictions are
not only likely to be found in Republican-controlled jurisdictions, but
23
are also likely to be similar in kind across those jurisdictions. Part of
this could be copying or learning from the experiences of other states.
But the similarity of these voting restrictions in form, and their
prevalence across states with significantly different prior voting
regimes and divergent demographics, points to something else. The
likeliest hypothesis is that both political parties have a similar
understanding of the relation between turnout and electoral
outcomes, and both parties understand voting access as a threshold
determinant of turnout.
This Article offers several observations about the changed legal
and political environment pertaining to the right to vote. With a focus
on turnout comes an appreciation that election rules matter and that
control of the rules can affect balloting and results. Although this has
long been known to political insiders, the battle for control of the
rules of the game has not generally played out on the national stage.
Unfortunately, all this changed with the contested presidential
election in Florida in 2000, and the legal battles leading to Bush v.
24
Gore. Beginning with the run-up to the 2010 elections, and then
heating up after their loss in 2012, Republicans—as the “out” party—
turned to ballot-access reform as a major strategic aim, justified by
25
the claimed need to combat fraud at the polls.
In turn, the pitched battles over ballot access have brought the
most basic issues of the franchise back into mainstream legal and
political discourse. The coincidence between the rise of ballot-access
issues and the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County
complicates the picture. The demise of the trigger for administrative
oversight under the VRA after Shelby County highlights the

23. See infra Table 2.
24. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
25. See David Schultz, Republicans Use Vote Suppression as Electoral Strategy, ALJAZEERA AM. (Oct. 29, 2014, 2:00 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/10/2014midterm-electionsgopvotersuppressiondemocrats.html (documenting instances in which
Republicans reformed ballot access); Hans A. von Spakovsky, Voter Photo Identification:
Protecting the Security of Elections, HERITAGE FOUND. (July 13, 2011), http://www.heritage
.org/Research/Reports/2011/07/Voter-Photo-Identification-Protecting-the-Security-of-Elections
(justifying voter restrictions on a fraud-prevention rationale).

ISSACHAROFF IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

BALLOT BEDLAM

3/24/2015 12:14 PM

1371

inevitable racial impact of any strategy to reduce Democratic voter
26
turnout or, correspondingly, of Democratic efforts to increase
27
turnout. There is an inescapable overlap between Democratic voters
who might be screened out by ballot restrictions, and the minority
communities whose voting rights were the object of the VRA. In
many jurisdictions the efforts at partisan gain look very much like
older efforts at racial exclusion. To the conventional question
whether the renewed ballot restrictions should be understood in
terms of race or party, the answer unfortunately is yes. Race and
party are intertwined to such a large extent that it is difficult to
28
disentangle the two when seeking a simple narrative of causation.
But the more difficult question is a different one: How is it that a
mature democracy like the United States still allows basic rules of
ballot access to be a battleground for political skirmishing?
I. THE RULES OF VOTING
As the following depiction (Table 2) shows, there is a strong
correlation between Republican control of the electionadministration process in a state and the efforts made to regulate
ballot access more intensively in that state. Table 2 shows both states
previously covered by Section 5, and those that were not covered.
The operative variable in all circumstances is which party is in control
in any particular state. The types of regulations include increased
voter-ID requirements for in-person voting, stricter voter-registration
requirements, and curtailment of early-voting opportunities. These
regulations are most likely to emerge when there is a Republican
29
governor and Republican control of the state legislature. In fact,

26. See, e.g., Jamelle Bouie, Republicans Admit Voter-ID Laws Are Aimed at Democratic
Voters, THE DAILY BEAST (Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/08/28/
republicans-admit-voter-id-laws-are-aimed-at-democratic-voters.html (documenting examples
of Republican candor about an anti-Democratic voting strategy, and studies of the racial
salience thereof).
27. See Jonathan Martin, At Risk in Senate, Democrats Seek To Rally Blacks, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 31, 2014, at A1 (describing the Democratic Party’s efforts to increase minority-voter
turnout).
28. See Richard Hasen, Race or Party?: How Courts Should Think About Republican
Efforts To Make It Harder To Vote in North Carolina and Elsewhere, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 58,
67 (2014).
29. Keith G. Bentele & Erin E. O’Brien, Jim Crow 2.0? Why States Consider and Adopt
Restrictive Voter Access Policies, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 1088, 1103 (2014). The Brennan Center’s
latest update on voting laws noted that of the twenty-two states to have approved new votinglaw regulations since 2010, eighteen states and every “strict” voter-ID state had Republican-
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with the exception of a voter-ID requirement in Rhode Island and
some alterations in Illinois and West Virginia, these restrictions are in
force only in states under Republican control.
30

Table 2. New Voting Requirements Passed Since 2010
STATE
Alabama

VOTER ID


VOTER
REGISTRATION



Arizona

31



Florida



32

New Hampshire



North Carolina



South Carolina



Texas





Virginia





Arkansas









Illinois
Indiana




Georgia
Mississippi

EARLY VOTING



controlled legislatures and Republican governors. Wendy Weiser & Erik Opsal, The State of
Voting in 2014, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (June 17, 2014), http://www.brennan
center.org/analysis/state-voting-2014 (providing a comprehensive account of election-law
changes since 2010).
30. Table 2 draws on data from the Brennan Center’s compilation of state laws. See Weiser
& Opsal, supra note 29. Bold text indicates states that were once completely or partly covered
under Section 5. Highlighting indicates states that were under Republican control at the time of
the VRA’s passage. See VOTING SECTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 21 (listing
previously covered jurisdictions). I deem a state to have been under Republican control if two
out of three of the state’s senate, house, and governorship were controlled by Republicans.
Restrictions that were passed but later repealed are excluded.
31. Arizona’s voter-registration restrictions are enacted, but they are presently judicially
enjoined pending the outcome of a convoluted lawsuit aimed at requiring the federal
government to include stricter proof-of-citizenship requirements on the federal registration
form. See Kobach v. U.S. Election Assistance Comm’n, 772 F.3d 1183, 1199 (10th Cir. 2014).
32. Adopted as a constitutional amendment via voter petition rather than by the
legislature. MISS. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL TABULATION OF VOTE FOR STATEWIDE
INITIATIVE MEASURE NO. 27, at 10 (Dec. 8, 2011), http://www.sos.ms.gov/links/elections/
results/statewideStatewide%20Initiative%20Measure%2027%20%20General%20Election%20
2011%20Results.pdf.
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Ohio
Pennsylvania



Rhode Island



Tennessee







35




West Virginia
Wisconsin
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Consider three states: Texas, North Carolina, and Wisconsin.
Under Section 5, preclearance of proposed voting changes by the
DOJ was triggered by the existence of restrictive voting practices and
depressed voter turnout in the 1964 presidential election. The
coverage formula generated by 1964 presidential-election statistics
yielded inclusion under the preclearance regime for entire states in
the old Confederacy, and for some counties in other states, including
36
Northern states such as New York or South Dakota. Of the states
under consideration, only Texas was subject to Section 5 under the
now-defunct coverage formula. North Carolina, a border state, had
37
been partially covered; Wisconsin was not covered at all. Yet all
three have adopted largely similar voter-ID laws in more-or-less the
same time frame, and did so before Section 5 was rendered impotent
38
in Shelby County. These three states have little in common, save that

33. As with Arizona, Kansas’s voter-registration restrictions are enjoined pending a lawsuit
initiated by the secretary of state to push federal officials to help enforce proof-of-citizenship
measures. See Kobach, 772 F.3d at 1199.
34. Montana attempted, but ultimately failed, to abolish same-day registration by
referendum. See Damon Daniels, Montana Voters Keep Same-Day Registration, DEMOS (Nov.
7, 2014), http://www.demos.org/blog/11/7/14/montana-voters-keep-same-day-registration.
35. Ohio’s restriction on early voting was partially the result of interventions by the
Republican secretary of state. See Zachary Roth, Ohio Cuts Early Voting Method Favored by
Blacks, MSNBC.COM (Feb. 25, 2014 3:24 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/ohio-early-votingcuts.
36. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JURISDICTIONS PREVIOUSLY COVERED BY SECTION 5,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/covered.php (last visited Mar. 10, 2015).
37. VOTING SECTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 21.
38. Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013), was handed down on June 25, 2013.
Both Wisconsin and Texas adopted their respective voter-ID laws long before this date. See
2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 619–25; 2011 Wis. Sess. Laws 103–27 (Act 23). North Carolina was actively
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they were, at the time of Section 5’s invalidation, uniformly under
39
Republican control. Indeed, the contrast between our three cases
becomes even starker when we consider the various factors identified
40
in the Senate Report for a different provision of the VRA, Section 2,
which addressed diminished minority electoral opportunity. The
following Senate Report factors in Table 3 can be easily statistically
41
measured:

considering its voter-ID laws before Shelby County, at which point its primary state-Senate
sponsor ominously—and without further explanation—declared: “‘So, now we can go with the
full bill,’” one that included a panoply of other restrictions. N.C. State Conference of NAACP v.
McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d 322, 336 (M.D.N.C. 2014), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. League
of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224 (4th Cir. 2014), staying order, 135 S.
Ct. 6 (2014); see id. at 335–38 (discussing the legislative process in depth).
39. Texas’s House of Representatives was under Democratic control until 2000; North
Carolina had a Democratic governor until 2013; a Republican governor took office concurrently
with a state-assembly majority in Wisconsin only from 2011 onwards. For a discussion on statelegislature control, see NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, STATE PARTISAN COMPOSITION
(Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/partisan-composition.aspx.
For gubernatorial election results in the relevant date range (except Texas), see NAT’L
GOVERNORS
ASS’N,
Gubernatorial
Election
Results
(Jan.
8,
2015),
http://www.nga.org/cms/elections; see also TEX. ST. LIBR. & ARCHIVES COMM’N, Governors of
Texas, 1846-Present, https://www.tsl.texas.gov/ref/abouttx/governors.html (last visited Mar. 10,
2015) (listing all past Texas governors; noting that Anne Richards, the last Democrat to hold the
office, was succeeded by George W. Bush, a Republican, in 1995; and observing that the office
has been held by Republicans ever since).
40. The Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982 expressly overturned the Supreme
Court’s decision in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), that a plaintiff must show that the state
actors being sued evinced a racially discriminatory purpose to win a Section 2 claim; instead, the
VRA was clarified to require merely a showing of discriminatory effect. Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1982 § 2, Pub. L. No. 97-205 (1982), 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (2014). Courts have
relied on the Senate report accompanying the amendments, S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28–29 (1982),
which listed various factors that might be considered in determining disparate impact. See
generally SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA KARLAN & RICHARD PILDES, THE LAW OF
DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 623–51 (4th ed. 2012)
[hereinafter THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY] (describing the Senate Report and its factors in
considerable detail). The factors from this Report have been a critically important part of
litigation under the amended VRA since the Supreme Court’s reliance on them in Thornburg v.
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
41. See THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 40, at 638–39.
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Table 3. Racial and Ethnic Factors
42

Black population in 2013
43
Hispanic population in 2013
Percentage of minority legislators in 2008 of
44
entire state legislature (black/Hispanic)
Racial polarization: Blacks voting for Obama in
45
2008
Racial polarization: Whites voting for McCain
46
in 2008
Section 5 Preclearance DOJ Objections, 2000–
47
2013 (and total since 1965)
48
Voting-Rights Violations, 2000–2014
49
Date voter-restrictive law was enacted
Date Republicans achieved a “trifecta” after
50
2000

Texas

N. Carolina

Wisconsin

12.4%
38.4%
29%
(9%/20%)
98%

22%
8.9%
20%
(19%/1%)
95%

6.5%
6.3%
1%
(0%/1%)
91%

73%

64%

45%

16 (207)

6 (67)

N/A

30
May 27, 2011
2001

4
Aug. 12, 2013
2013

1
May 25, 2011
2011

42. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, State and County Quick Facts: Texas, http://quickfacts.census
.gov/qfd/states/48000.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2015); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, State and County
Quick Facts: North Carolina, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/37000.html (last visited Mar.
10, 2015); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, State and County Quick Facts: Wisconsin, http://quick
facts.census.gov/qfd/states/55000.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2015).
43. See sources cited supra note 42.
44. NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, AFRICAN-AMERICAN LEGISLATORS 2009,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/african-american-legislators-in-2009.aspx
(last visited Mar. 10, 2015); NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, LATINO LEGISLATORS 2009,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/latino-legislators-overview.aspx
(last
visited Mar. 10, 2015). The 2008 dataset is the latest available.
45. Vexingly, the National Exit Poll Consortium, which conducts what is considered the
most reliable exit poll, chose for cost-cutting reasons to skip nineteen states, including Texas, in
the 2012 presidential election. Jon Cohen & Scott Clement, Networks, AP Cancel Exit Polls in
19 States, WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2012/
10/04/networks-ap-cancel-exit-polls-in-19-states. Thus, I have used the 2008 exit-poll data.
Election Center 2008: Exit Polls, CNN.COM (Nov. 2008), http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/
2008/results/polls.
46. Election Center 2008: Exit Polls, supra note 45.
47. Voting Determination Letters for Texas, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/records/vot/obj_letters/state_letters.php?state=tx (last visited Mar. 10,
2015) (listing all objection letters interposed against Texas since the inception of Section 5);
Voting Determination Letters for North Carolina, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/records/vot/obj_letters/state_letters.php?state=nc (last visited Mar.
10, 2015) (same, for North Carolina).
48. THE PERSISTENT CHALLENGE OF VOTING DISCRIMINATION: A STUDY OF RECENT
VOTING RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY STATE, LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL & HUMAN
RIGHTS 18, 22–26, 27 (2014), available at http://www.civilrights.org/press/2014/RacialDiscrimination-in-Voting-Whitepaper.pdf (listing violations).
49. 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 1507 (Session Law 2013-381); 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 619–25; 2011
Wis. Sess. Laws 103–27 (Act 23).
50. Restrictive voter-ID laws of the type under discussion in this Article were not
implemented in any great number until the twenty-first century. See generally Voting Laws
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Table 3 shows the differences in state voter composition across
three states that are the subject of intensive current litigation. Despite
these marked dissimilarities, each state’s response was basically
similar. A specific focus on the new voter-ID laws shows the overlap
in both the adoption of each state’s voter-ID law and the laws’
ultimate content:
51

Table 4. Voter-ID Provisions

Texas

N. Carolina

Wisconsin

Ballots not counted without presentation of ID
(either at polls or after casting provisional ballots)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Only photo IDs accepted

Yes

Yes

Yes

Only in-state photo IDs accepted

Yes

52

Yes

Veteran IDs not accepted

Yes

No

Yes

Student IDs not accepted

Yes

Yes

No

Vests discretion in local official to determine
whether voter bears resemblance to photo on ID

Yes

Yes

Yes

Exempts from photo-ID requirement only those
who have a religious objection to being
photographed or whose ID has been destroyed in
a natural disaster

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

Supplemental free election photo IDs accepted
Exempts absentee voting from photo-ID
requirements

53

No

Roundup, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/election-2012voting-laws-roundup (listing all proposed and enacted changes to voting laws since 2010). A
“trifecta” refers to a time at which a Republican governor held office concurrently with a
Republican majority in both houses of the state legislature. See sources cited supra note 39.
51. See generally 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 1507 (Session Law 2013-381); 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws
619–25; 2011 Wis. Sess. Laws 103–27 (Act 23).
52. Specifically, the act permits the use of “[a] drivers license or nonoperators
identification card issued by another state, the District of Columbia, or a territory or
commonwealth of the United States, but only if the voter’s voter registration was within 90 days
of the election.” 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 1507 (Session Law 2013-381 § 2.1(e)(8)) (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 163-166.13(e)(8)).
53. Supplemental free election photo IDs are state-issued IDs that enable the holder to
vote, but are useless for any other purpose (by law).
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II. FRAUD, VOTE SUPPRESSION, AND THE POWER OF FAITH
It is remarkable that the question of election fraud has surfaced
as a hot-button political issue, with a focus on in-person vote fraud,
no less. Very few elections turn so close to the margin as to be
susceptible to fraudulent manipulation by individual voters
pretending to be eligible to vote more than once. There are certainly
examples in U.S. history of vote fraud, running from the habits of
Tammany Hall operatives of throwing ballot boxes into the East
54
River, to the curious propensity of dead persons in some southTexas counties to all vote for Lyndon Johnson, and to arrive at the
55
polls to do so in alphabetical order. Whether tossing out ballots or
stuffing the ballot box, all of these mechanisms operate at the
wholesale level. Trying to tip an election by retail-voter
impersonation is much like trying to change the salinity of the sea by
adding a box of salt. Not surprisingly, the bipartisan presidential
commission, which was appointed in the wake of the 2012 election to
56
examine proposals for election reform, dismissed the claims of inperson vote fraud as insignificant, stating: “Fraud is rare, but when it
57
does occur, absentee ballots are often the method of choice.”

54. Local lore has it that the massive lever-voting machines long in use in New York City
were first selected because they were too heavy to toss into the river. See ANDREW GUMBEL,
STEAL THIS VOTE 7 (2005) (“Ballots have been bought and sold on the open market, stolen,
forged, spoiled, and tossed into lakes, rivers, and oceans.”); Jennifer 8. Lee, A Love Affair with
Lever Voting Machines, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2009, 7:15 AM), http://cityroom.blogs
.nytimes.com/2009/03/10/a-love-affair-with-lever-voting-machines (“[Lever machines] became
widely adopted across the entire city by 1926 because they were seen as more resistant to
tampering—a tremendous problem during 19th-century elections.”). My colleague, Michael
Waldman, believes that this story stems from the time Henry George ran for mayor of New
York against Abram Hewitt. See GEORGE SELDES, WITNESS TO A CENTURY 192 (2011) (“[I]t
was later revealed that Tammany Hall not only stuffed the ballot boxes for Hewitt but threw
many Henry George ballots and boxes into one of the rivers. Henry George was counted out.
He died three or four years later.”).
55. “Box 13” in Jim Wells County contained over two hundred such votes, just enough to
put Lyndon B. Johnson over his opponent, Coke Stevenson, in the 1948 Democratic Primary.
See ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: MEANS OF ASCENT 324–30 (1991).
To be fair to Johnson, he fervently believed, with some justification, that Stevenson had done
the same to him four years earlier. Id.
56. See Exec. Order No. 13,639, 78 Fed. Reg. 19,979 (Mar. 28, 2013) (establishing the
Presidential Commission on Election Administration).
57. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON ELECTION ADMIN., THE AMERICAN VOTING
EXPERIENCE: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
ELECTION ADMINISTRATION 56 (2014) (citing Paul Gronke, Professor of Political Science,
Reed College, PCEA Hearing Testimony, Denver, CO, at 48 (Aug. 8, 2013)), available at
https://www.supportthevoter.gov/files/2014/01/Amer-Voting-Exper-final-draft-01-09-14-508.pdf.
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Yet once inserted into the partisan blend, vote fraud takes on a
life of its own. It is difficult to disprove nonspecific allegations of
fraud as illegal conduct subject to conspiracy prosecution, and thus
unlikely to be broadcast. This gives some ballast to the argument that
because vote fraud is undetected, it is likely occurring—a classically
nonfalsifiable proposition that cannot move the terms of debate
beyond matters of prior belief. The most comprehensive studies
indicate both that there are virtually no established cases of in-person
vote fraud, and that some people nonetheless hold strong beliefs that
58
others have either seen or heard of actual cases. Paradoxically, the
level at which a voter-ID law is exacting in any particular jurisdiction
does not appear to reduce the public perception of fraud, and the
level of exaction may even be correlated with an increased concern
59
over fraud —perhaps the public-policy equivalent of being told not
60
to think about hippos in tutus chasing swirling broomsticks. The best
predictor of individual beliefs regarding vote fraud may well be each
individual’s partisan affiliation. Unfortunately, one’s partisan

58. See Robert Pastor, Robert Santos, Alison Prevost, & Vassia Stoilov, Voting and ID
Requirements: A Survey of Registered Voters in Three States, 40 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 461, 475
(2010). Pastor et al. note that 53.2 percent of registered voters surveyed in Indiana, a state with
strict voter-ID laws, report hearing about fraud at another polling place, while 73.1 percent of
those surveyed in Maryland, a state without strict voter-ID laws, report hearing about fraud at
another polling place. Id. at 464, 475. Compare Justin Levitt, A Comprehensive Investigation of
Voter Impersonation Finds 31 Credible Incidents Out of One Billion Ballots Cast, WASH. POST
(Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/08/06/a-comprehen
sive-investigation-of-voter-impersonation-finds-31-credible-incidents-out-of-one-billion-ballotscast (listing discrete incidents), and LORRAINE MINNITE, THE MYTH OF VOTER FRAUD (2010)
(same), with Pastor et al., supra, at 477 (noting that one-fifth of registered voters surveyed saw
or heard of fraud at their own polling place).
59. See Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Vote Fraud in the Eye of the Beholder:
The Role of Public Opinion in the Challenge to Voter Identification Requirements, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 1737, 1756 (2008) (finding, through the use of a comprehensive survey instrument (and
controlling for usual confounders), that fears of fraud remain flat when voter-ID laws are
implemented—indeed, “those subjected to photo ID requirements believe, if anything, that
fraud is more prevalent”). But see Pastor et al., supra note 58, at 464, 475 (finding a higher
expectation of fraud at other polling stations in a state with less strict voter-ID laws).
60. This is a well-established phenomenon in psychology that trades under the name of
“ironic process theory,” whereby the further we try to push an image from our mind, the more
difficult it is to do so. See generally DANIEL M. WEGNER, WHITE BEARS AND OTHER
UNWANTED THOUGHTS (1994) (providing an authoritative study of the phenomenon as applied
to psychology); FANTASIA (Walt Disney Pictures 1940) (featuring hippos in tutus, as well as
swirling broomsticks).
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affiliation has a powerful relationship to whether one believes in vote
61
fraud and many other areas of policy.
Faith does operate on both sides of the partisan divide. Possibly,
however, there is a greater factual basis for opponents of ratchetedup voting rules to fear that something more may be going on. For
much of American history, the issue of fraud has been associated with
efforts to suppress the franchise of minorities and other “out”
62
groups. The particular forms of contemporary franchise restrictions,
especially the more exacting ID requirements, are susceptible to a
racially disparate impact. Efforts to discern the at-risk population
63
show that minorities are more likely to lack either a driver’s license

61. In particular, partisanship is the critical lens through which the public weighs the
usefulness of strict voter-ID laws. See Ansolabehere & Persily, supra note 59, at 1747 (“Party
remains a significant predictor of beliefs about both Fraud and Impersonation in a multivariate
analysis that controls for ideology, education, age, race, income, and region.”). Party, too, is a
powerful explanatory variable for belief in a variety of theories, including, but not limited to, the
belief that “shape-shifting reptilian people control our world by taking on human form and
gaining political power to manipulate our societies”—a belief held by nearly twice as many
people who voted in 2012 for the Republican presidential candidate than for the Democratic
presidential candidate. Press Release, Public Policy Polling, Democrats and Republicans Differ
on Conspiracy Theory Beliefs (Apr. 2, 2013), available at http://www.publicpolicy
polling.com/pdf/2011/PPP_Release_National_ConspiracyTheories_040213.pdf; see also Dan M.
Kahan, Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for
Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19 (2011) (surveying psychological research that
found that unsubstantiated factual claims indicate motivated cognition, the phenomenon in
which identity is expressed through particular factual claims); Spencer Overton, Voter
Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631, 663 (2007) (stressing that most arguments concerning
voter identification have been premised on unsubstantiated factual assumptions).
62. See generally LORRAINE C. MINNITE, THE POLITICS OF VOTER FRAUD 14–21 (2007),
available at http://poli375engage.pbworks.com/f/Politics_of_Voter_Fraud_Final.pdf (outlining
the history of voter restrictions employed against minority groups justified as preventing fraud);
see also ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S.
HISTORY (1997) (tying franchise eligibility to efforts to diminish the political influence of new
immigrants).
63. The process-tracing approach sprang from research into the low availability of driver’s
licenses, which has a significant impact on economic mobility. See generally OFF. OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, Answers About
Identification: I Want To Open a New Account. What Type of Identification Do I Have To
Present to the Bank?, http://www.helpwithmybank.gov/get-answers/bank-accounts/identification/
faq-bank-accounts-identification-02.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2015) Barbara Corkrey, Restoring
Drivers’ Licenses Removes a Common Legal Barrier to Employment, 37 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
523 (2004); see also JOHN PAWASARAT, THE DRIVER LICENSE STATUS OF THE VOTING AGE
POPULATION IN WISCONSIN 3 (2005), available at http://www.uwm.edu/Dept/ETI/barriers/
DriversLicense.pdf (using database matching to show that in Wisconsin, “[f]or AfricanAmericans, only 45 percent of males and 51 percent of females have a valid drivers license,” and
for Hispanics, “54 percent of males and only 41 percent of females [have] a valid drivers
license”); cf. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2012) (requiring, with some exceptions, that
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or another form of accepted photo identification. Most studies show
that this racially disparate pattern persists even when controlling for
65
other factors such as education or income. Put together, these
historical and present social-science studies indicate that minority
voters are more at risk of being excluded by increased voter-ID laws,
and that there is reason for concern when fraud claims overlap with
disfavored minority voters’ claims of exclusion.
Predilection does not constitute proof, however. The fact that
restrictions on the franchise in general—and voter-ID laws in
particular—play to the vulnerabilities of discrete communities does
not establish that there is any discernible impact, either on overall
turnout or on differential turnout among various groups. Recall that
somewhere between 40 and 60 percent of eligible voters do not

employers verify the citizenship of each person they employ by use of at least one piece of
secondary identification).
64. BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CITIZENS WITHOUT PROOF: A SURVEY OF AMERICANS’
POSSESSION OF DOCUMENTARY PROOF OF CITIZENSHIP AND PHOTO IDENTIFICATION 1–3
(Nov. 2006), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/d/download_
file_39242.pdf (conducting a random poll of 987 adults adjusted for demographic factors, and
finding that at least 11 percent of U.S. citizens lacked an unexpired government-issued photo
ID, and that 18 percent of the elderly and 25 percent of African Americans likewise lacked such
an ID, as compared to 8 percent of whites). But see Pastor et al., supra note 58, at 469 (surveying
registered voters in Maryland, Mississippi, and Indiana, and finding that only 1.2 percent of total
responders lacked any form of government-issued photo ID).
65. See Matt A. Barreto, Stephen A. Nuño & Gabriel R. Sanchez, The Disproportionate
Impact of Voter-ID Requirements on the Electorate: New Evidence from Indiana, 42 PS: POL. SCI
& POL. 111, 113 (2009) (“Even among likely voters [in Indiana], differences persist with respect
to race. Among all registered voters, 84.2% of whites have the correct ID credential in Indiana
compared to 78.0% of blacks . . . . When we only focus on likely voters, those who consistently
voted in 2002, 2004, and 2006, a 6-point gap between blacks and whites is still evident.”); Matt
A. Barreto, Stephen A. Nuño & Gabriel R. Sanchez, The Disproportionate Impact of Indiana
Voter ID Requirements on the Electorate 13 (Wash. Inst. for the Study of Ethnicity & Race,
Working Paper, Nov. 8, 2007), available at http://depts.washington.edu/uwiser/documents/
Indiana_voter.pdf (finding a gap of 11.5 percent between black and white possession of voter
IDs on the basis of a survey of Indiana residents); Matt A. Barreto, Stephen A. Nuño & Gabriel
R. Sanchez, Voter ID Requirements and the Disenfranchisements of Latino, Black and Asian
Voters 14–17 (Am. Pol. Sci. Ass’n, Annual Meeting Paper, Sept. 1, 2007), available at
http://faculty.washington.edu/mbarreto/research/Voter_ID_APSA.pdf (conducting exit polls of
voters in California, New Mexico, and Washington state to find that among voters, Latinos and
blacks were not less likely to possess driver’s licenses than white voters, but that racial
minorities were potentially more than 20 percent less likely to possess two forms of
identification as compared to white voters). But see M.V. Hood III & Charles S. Bullock III,
Worth a Thousand Words? An Analysis of Georgia’s Voter Identification Statute, 36 AM. POL.
RES. 555, 571–72 (2008) (determining, after an examination of databases in Georgia, that urban
and rural populations have similar rates of driver’s-license possession, and finding that when
measuring affluence on the basis of zip code of residence, the poor were about as likely to
possess driver’s licenses as the rich).
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66

participate in federal elections. The question therefore is whether
the new voter restrictions affect individuals who would have voted
absent such restrictions. The alternative, and perhaps more likely,
hypothesis is that the same individuals who are likely to fall under an
enhanced voter-ID requirement are also unlikely to vote at all,
regardless of the mechanics of the voting restriction. This is a hard
empirical question given that, at least for some portion of the
nonvoting population, the decision whether or not to participate on
election day is likely made at the margins and turns on the ease of
voting, peer pressure, engagement by a candidate, competing
personal obligations, and a host of such idiosyncratic factors.
Undoubtedly across the mass of the American population, any
encumbrances to the ability to vote will have some effect. But the
issue is whether the impact of these impediments falls primarily on
voters who are already marginalized from electoral engagement and
who would not have voted regardless of these burdens.
To date, empirical studies have focused on the effect of voter-ID
laws, but have been unable to find any substantial decline either in
overall turnout or in the turnout of racial minorities as a result of
67
these laws. Most studies testing a causal relationship between voter-

66. See supra Table 1.
67. See, e.g., Shelley de Alth, ID at the Polls: Assessing the Impact of Recent State Voter ID
Laws on Voter Turnout, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 185, 201 (2009) (finding that strengthened
voter-ID laws were, at most, associated with a 1.1 percent decline in voter turnout); Stephen
Ansolabehere, Access Versus Integrity in Voter Identification Requirements, 63 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 613, 625–26 (2008) (examining several large survey sets to find that as an
empirical matter, few if any voters reported being unable to vote or forced to cast a provisional
ballot because of voter-ID laws); M.V. Hood III & Charles S. Bullock III, Much Ado About
Nothing? An Empirical Assessment of the Georgia Voter ID Statute, 12 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 394,
394 (2012) (finding that the Georgia voter-ID law decreased overall turnout by 0.4 percent in
2008, but that no empirical evidence suggests that this effect was due to racial or ethnic
discrimination); Jason D. Mycoff, Michael W. Wagner & David C. Wilson, The Empirical
Effects of Voter-ID Laws: Present or Absent?, 42 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 121, 125 (2009)
[hereinafter Mycoff et al., Empirical] (“Thus, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that voter-ID
laws do not significantly affect turnout.”); R. Michael Alvarez, Delia Bailey & Jonathan N.
Katz, The Effect of Voter Identification Laws on Turnout 18 (Cal Inst. of Tech., Div. of the
Humanities & Social Sci., Working Paper No. 1267R, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1084598 (analyzing data from 2000–06 and,
after controlling for education and income, finding no disparate racial impact); John R. Lott, Jr.,
Evidence of Voter Fraud and the Impact that Regulations To Reduce Fraud Have on Voter
Participation Rates 8–9 (Crime Prevention Research Ctr., Working Paper, 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=925611 (accounting for a variety of other
factors, and finding a 2.2 percent decline in the probability of voting when states require
nonphoto ID or photo ID with substitution); Jason D. Mycoff, Michael W. Wagner & David C.
Wilson, The Effect of Voter Identification Laws on Aggregate and Individual Level Turnout 17
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ID laws and turnout have determined the impact of voter-ID laws on
68
overall and minority turnout to be minor at best. It is easy to
imagine that persons sufficiently distant from institutional
arrangements providing or independently requiring a photo ID would
69
also be more likely not to vote. This is a matter of conjecture, but it
is striking that relatively few persons have actually been identified as
70
impeded by voter-ID requirements in litigation thus far, a fact that

(Am. Pol. Sci. Ass’n, Annual Meeting Paper, Aug. 2007), available at http://www.brennan
center.org/sites/default/files/legacy/d/download_file_50900.pdf [hereinafter Mycoff et al., Effect
of Voter Identification] (using database matching over multiple states from the 2000–06 elections
to conclude that “basic socio-demographics and other individual level characteristics such as
political interest have a much larger effect on voting behavior than political context variables
such as the type and degree of identification required for voting”); Timothy Vercellotti & David
Anderson, Protecting the Franchise or Restricting it? The Effects of Voter Identification
Requirements on Turnout 13–14 (Am. Pol. Sci. Ass’n, Working Paper, Aug. 31 2006), available
at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/blogs/tokaji/voter%20id%20and%20turnout%20study.pdf (looking
at the 2004 election only, and finding that imposing voter-ID requirements “reduced
probabilities of voting of about 3 to 4 percent for the entire sample, with larger differences for
specific subgroups,” in particular, poor communities of color).
68. See, e.g., Alth, supra note 67, at 201 (finding a decline in turnout from strict voter-ID
laws); Ansolabehere, supra note 67, at 625–26 (examining several large survey sets to find that
as an empirical matter, few if any voters reported being unable to vote, or forced to cast a
provisional ballot, because of voter-ID laws); Kyle Dropp, Voter Identification Law and Voter
Turnout 27–30 (May 28, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://kyledropp.weebly
.com/uploads/1/2/0/9/12094568/dropp_voter_id.pdf (finding a 2.3 percent relative decline in
Democratic turnout but negligible racial impact of voter-ID laws); Hood & Bullock, supra note
67, at 394 (finding that the Georgia voter-ID law decreased overall turnout by 0.4 percent in
2008, but finding no empirical evidence to suggest that this effect was racial or ethnic); Mycoff et
al., Empirical, supra note 67, at 125; Michael Pitts & Matthew Neumann, Documenting
Disenfranchisement: Voter Identification During Indiana’s 2008 General Election, 15 J.L. & POL.
329, 354 (2009) (finding that since the Indiana primary, ID-related provisional ballots cast in
Indiana increased in concert with provisional ballots of all kinds, suggesting that the trend in
provisional balloting had little if anything to do with the voter-ID law); Mycoff et al., Effect of
Voter Identification, supra note 67, at 17.
69. See Hood & Bullock, supra note 65, at 573 (finding that even without strict voter-ID
laws, “those [registered voters] who lack driver’s licenses are generally less engaged politically”
and thus less likely to vote even before a strict voter-ID law is applied). See generally JAN E.
LEIGHLEY & JONATHAN NAGLER, WHO VOTES NOW? DEMOGRAPHICS, ISSUES, INEQUALITY,
AND TURNOUT IN THE UNITED STATES 27–51 (2014) (describing in detail why poorer, urban,
and black voters—precisely those constituencies that organizations like the Brennan Center
have concluded lack photo IDs—might be independently dissuaded from voting).
70. In a Texas district-court case considering the constitutionality of voter-ID laws, only
nine witnesses were presented as unable to vote because they lacked the proper documentation.
Veasey v. Perry, No. 13-CV-00193, 2014 WL 5090258, at *28 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2014). In
Wisconsin, only eight individuals who intended to vote in the state’s elections, but who did not
currently possess a qualifying photo ID, testified against Wisconsin’s voter-ID laws. Frank v.
Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 854 (E.D. Wis. 2014), rev’d, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014).
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seemed to sway Justice Stevens in upholding the Indiana voter-ID law
71
in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board.
It is perhaps too soon to be entirely sanguine about no harm, no
foul. First, the empirical studies on the impact of restrictive ID
practices are problematic, both because the new round of voting
72
restrictions is so recent, and also because the forms of voter-ID laws
73
74
vary across jurisdictions and have gotten more onerous over time.
There has not been enough time to test the observations against
normal fluctuations in turnout (such as those associated with off-year
75
elections) and other confounding political factors. At its most
71. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 201 (2008) (noting the small
number of individuals who demonstrated a burden at the trial level).
72. Daniel R. Biggers & Michael J. Hanmer, Why Voting Gets Harder: Understanding the
Adoption of Voter ID Laws in the American States 2–3 (Am. Pol. Sci. Ass’n, Working Paper,
2011), available at http://www.gvpt.umd.edu/apworkshop/papers_fall12/B%20and%20H%
20APW%209-21-12.pdf (tracing the turn from voting facilitation to voter suppression in the
states in the early twenty-first century); Vercellotti & Anderson, supra note 67, at 4–5 (finding
that no jurisdiction included in the study implemented a strict voter-ID law in which a voter was
prevented from voting unless he showed a state-issued photo ID).
73. Weiser & Opsal, supra note 29 (surveying the variety of voter-ID laws as of the 2014
general elections).
74. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 3-11-8-25.1 (West 2014) (listing acceptable IDs); id. § 311.7-5-2.5(b) (stating that a provisional ballot cast by a voter without an ID will generally not be
counted unless the voter presents an ID shortly afterwards). See generally INDIANA SECRETARY
OF ST. ELECTION DIVISION, Photo ID Law, http://www.in.gov/sos/elections/2401.htm (last
visited Mar. 10, 2015) (describing the implementation of Indiana’s voter-ID requirement).
Although a voter may swear in an affidavit that he is too “indigent” to afford a photo ID, this
option can be exercised only very shortly following the election rather than at the polls; the
voter must make a separate trip to the county clerk’s office to complete the affidavit. See GA.
CODE ANN. § 21-2-417(a) (West 2014) (effective Jan. 26, 2006) (listing Georgia’s photo-ID
requirements); id. § 21-2-417(b) (requiring the voter to provide identification after Election Day
for his provisional ballot to be counted); id. § 21-2-419(c) (setting a three-day time limit for the
person casting a provisional ballot to demonstrate his eligibility); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-2908(h)
(West 2014) (effective July 1, 2012) (listing acceptable forms of photo ID); id. § 25-3002(b)(8)
(“No ballot cast shall be counted if the voter fails to provide valid identification as defined by
K.S.A. 25-2908, and amendments thereto.”); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 63.0101 (West 2013)
(effective Jan. 1, 2012) (listing acceptable forms of photo ID); 2011 Wis. Sess. Laws 103–27 (Act
23), enjoined by Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 862–63 (E.D. Wis. 2014).
75. See Luke Keele & William Minozzi, How Much Is Minnesota Like Wisconsin?
Assumptions and Counterfactuals in Causal Inference with Observational Data, 21 POL.
ANALYSIS 193, 209 (2013) (describing the general difficulties implicit in utilizing the differencein-differences approach to analyze voter turnout, since “changes in the dynamics of elections
from one year to the next may invalidate key assumptions”); see also R. Michael Alvarez, Delia
Bailey & Jonathan N. Katz, An Empirical Bayes Approach To Estimating Ordinal Treatment
Effects, 19 POL. ANALYSIS 20, 20–21 (2011) (discussing particular methodological complexities
in the difference-in-differences approach when applied to voter ID). Such factors include age,
education, residential mobility, region, media exposure, mobilization (partisan and
nonpartisan), voting activity in previous elections, party identification, political interest, and
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simple, it would be hard to analyze black turnout in 2008 or 2012
without some account of the role of the Obama candidacy in
galvanizing black turnout, regardless of the encumbrances on the
76
franchise that may have been put in place.
Even across partisan dimensions, it is hard to figure out the exact
impact of the new voting restrictions. Again, among the new voting
77
restrictions, voter ID is the most studied and most litigated topic, but
political knowledge. Kaat Smets & Carolien van Ham, The Embarrassment of Riches? A MetaAnalysis of Individual-Level Research on Voter Turnout, 32 ELECTORAL STUD. 344, 348–56
(2013). One important element of political salience in the American context that can act as a
severe, but less detectable, local confounder is a ballot initiative. See John G. Matsusaka,
Election Closeness and Voter Turnout: Evidence from California Ballot Propositions, 76 PUB.
CHOICE 313, 332 (1993).
76. See generally Robert S. Erikson & Lorraine C. Minnite, Modeling Problems in the
Voter Identification–Voter Turnout Debate, 8 ELECTION L.J. 85, 87 (2009) (discussing difficulties
in designing studies to measure the effect of voter-ID laws on turnout). For example, any
examination of the impact of vote restrictions on black turnout in 2008 and 2012 would need to
confront the candidacy of Barack Obama at the head of the ballot, who both overwhelmingly
captured the black vote and drove up black turnout. See Tasha S. Philpot, Daron R. Shaw &
Ernest B. McGowen, Winning the Race: Black Voter Turnout in the 2008 Presidential Election,
73 PUB. OPINION Q. 995, 996–97 (2009). Further, any analysis that uses total voter turnout as a
variable must disentangle other partisan variables. See, e.g., Michael J. Pitts, Photo ID,
Provisional Balloting, and Indiana’s 2012 Primary Election, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 939, 952–54
(2013) (concluding that the decrease in provisional-ballot use, far from indicating that voter ID
is less of a problem than advertised in Indiana, most likely reflects high turnout from
Republicans and groups more likely to possess voter IDs). There are also variations in voting
reforms that make comparison between states difficult. See Keele & Minozzi, supra note 75, at
193–94 (stating that “the quality of any assumption is hard to assess outside the context of a
specific empirical application”). Finally, most voting legislation is still new, having been
approved only between 2012 and 2014, and some of these laws are only partially enforced
because of litigation. See, e.g., Veasey v. Perry, No. 13-CV-00193, 2014 WL 5090258, at *28 (S.D.
Tex. Oct. 9, 2014).
77. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008) (upholding a
voter-ID law against an equal-protection attack); Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted,
696 F.3d 580, 583–84 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that a consent decree’s differential treatment of
provisional ballots, depending on the form of identification used by voters, likely violated those
voters’ equal-protection right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in
the jurisdiction); Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340, 1345 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[B]ased
on the decision in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, which upheld a similar law in
Indiana . . . the burden imposed by the requirement of photo identification is outweighed by the
interests of Georgia in safeguarding the right to vote.” (citation omitted)); League of Women
Voters of Ohio v. Brunner, 548 F.3d 463, 472, 478–79 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding that plaintiffs
made sufficient allegations against the legality of a state voter-ID law to state a claim under the
Ohio Constitution’s equal-protection and substantive-due-process clauses, but not its
procedural-due-process clause); N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d
322, 334 (M.D.N.C. 2014) (holding that the plaintiffs failed to show a likelihood of success on
the merits of their VRA claims), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. League of Women Voters
of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224 (4th Cir. 2014), staying order, 135 S. Ct. 6 (2014); Frank
v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 880 (E.D. Wis. 2014) (enjoining a voter-ID law under Section 2),

ISSACHAROFF IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

BALLOT BEDLAM

3/24/2015 12:14 PM

1385

here too the evidence is weak as to any partisan effect. Part of the
effect, oddly, seems to be a paradoxical increase in the determination
of communities—particularly minority communities—to vote in the
face of perceived efforts at disenfranchisement, a countermobilization
78
that might increase Democratic-leaning turnout. Some of the lack of
effect might be a problem of the means of voter restrictions not
matching the intended targets. For example, putting the backlash
against restrictive voting laws aside, strict voter-ID laws requiring
documentary
proof
of
citizenship
upon
registration
disproportionately exclude women who have changed their surnames

rev’d, 768 F.3d 744, 745 (7th Cir. 2014) (finding that subsequent action by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court sufficiently altered the balance of equities to merit a stay of an injunction);
Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113, 115 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding that the state failed to show
that its voter-ID law would not lead to retrogression in the position of racial minorities with
respect to their effective exercise of electoral franchise), vacated and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 2886
(2013); Stewart v. Marion Cnty., No. 1:08-CV-586-LJM-TAB, 2010 WL 1579672, at *1 (S.D. Ind.
Apr. 16, 2010) (rejecting a poll-tax attack on a voter-ID law); Democratic Party of Ga., Inc. v.
Perdue, 707 S.E.2d 67, 72 (Ga. 2011) (finding that “the [challenged statute was not] an
impermissible qualification on voting . . . [because it did] not deprive any Georgia voter from
casting a ballot in any election”); League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita, 929 N.E.2d
758, 760–61 (Ind. 2010) (finding that the state’s requirement that in-person voters display a
government-issued photo ID did not impose an additional qualification in violation of the state
constitution); Applewhite v. Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D. 2012, 2014 WL 184988, at *26 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. Jan. 17, 2014) (holding that the state’s voter-ID law violated the state constitution’s
fundamental right to vote, but did not violate the federal or state equal-protection clauses,
despite a claim that the state statute had disproportionately adverse effects on certain minority
groups); City of Memphis v. Hargett, 414 S.W.3d 88, 104–06 (Tenn. 2013) (holding that the
Tennessee Voter Identification Act’s photo-ID requirement was narrowly tailored to achieve
the state’s compelling interest in the integrity of the election process, and that the burden of
travel time was not, without more, sufficient to render the requirement unconstitutional);
Milwaukee Branch of NAACP v. Walker, 851 N.W.2d 262, 265–66 (Wis. 2014) (approving
voter-ID requirements under a “saving construction”—that the Division of Motor Vehicles
must not require documents for which a voter must pay a fee to a government agency); League
of Women Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker, 851 N.W.2d 302, 305–06 (Wis. 2014)
(finding that the challenged statute did not impose an unconstitutionally unreasonable
restriction on the right to vote); cf. Serv. Emp. Int’l Union, Local 1 v. Husted, No. 2:12-CV-562,
2012 WL 5497757, at *1–3 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 13, 2012) (summarizing the complex history of the
consent decree in Ohio, which ensures that voters without a photo ID can still cast counted
ballots).
78. See Barry C. Burden, David T. Canon, Kenneth R. Mayer & Donald P. Moynihan,
Election Laws, Mobilization, and Turnout: The Unanticipated Consequences of Election Reform,
58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 95, 97–99 (2014) (articulating the mobilization thesis with regard to earlyvoting changes); Jack Citrin, Donald P. Green & Morris Levy, The Effects of Voter ID
Notification on Voter Turnout: Results from a Large-Scale Field Experiment, 13 ELECTION L.J.
228, 235 (2014) (finding that alerting voters to the existence of a voter-ID requirement via direct
mail may boost turnout by as much as 2 percent).

ISSACHAROFF IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1386

3/24/2015 12:14 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:1363

79

since birth, and laws looking for currently valid driver’s licenses
80
disproportionately disadvantage the elderly —both of whom lean
81
Republican.
***
Although the empirical picture of ballot access is complicated, its
prominence as a legal and political issue is clear. For the first time
since the Civil Rights Era, courts are confronting voting-rights claims
that turn not on the allocation of electoral opportunity across
different voting systems or on redistricting configurations, but on
basic right-to-vote issues. The restrictions implemented to date may
not be particularly effective, but they are currently the subject of
intensive litigation in many states, most notably in North Carolina,
82
Texas, and Wisconsin. The next question concerns the proper legal
framework for considering the new voting-rights challenges—
specifically, whether the tools used to deny the franchise when race
was the predominant paradigm for doing so continue to do the work
today.

79. See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, supra note 64 (reporting the results of a random poll
of 967 adults (adjusted for demographic factors), which found that a full 34 percent of votingage women did not have ready access to any proof of citizenship with their current legal name).
80. See id. (finding that 18 percent of the elderly lack a valid photo ID); PAWASARAT,
supra note 63, at 1, 11 (using database matching to find that 23 percent of persons age sixty-five
and over, or 177,399 people, do not have a Wisconsin state ID or driver’s license, but that the
overwhelming majority of those people are white).
81. Exit Polls 2012: How the Vote Has Shifted, WASH. POST (Nov. 6, 2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/2012-exit-polls/table.html (describing the
alignments of various demographic groups with the political parties, and the change of these
alignments over time); Dahlia Lithwick, Ladies’ Choice: Voter ID Laws Might Suppress the
Votes of Women. Republican Women, SLATE (Oct. 24, 2013, 11:26 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2013/10/how_voter_id_laws_might_suppress_th
e_votes_of_women_republican_women.html; see also Biggers & Hanmer, supra note 72, at 12
(“[The elderly’s] proclivity to vote, combined with weaker attachments to the Democratic Party,
make[] them an attractive segment to preserve in the electorate and removes any potential
partisan advantage in restricting their access to the polls.”).
82. See Weiser & Opsal, supra note 29 (listing the principal examples of such litigation); see
also Major Pending Election Administration Cases, MORITZ COLL. OF LAW AT THE OHIO
STATE UNIV., http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/election-law/major-pending-cases (last visited Mar. 10,
2015).
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III. RACE AND PARTISANSHIP IN VOTING-RIGHTS LAW
A. The Evolution of the Modern Right To Vote
Much of modern political-process law emerges from the historic
exclusion of black voters. Even cases that marked the Supreme
Court’s first insertion into the political thicket, notably Baker v.
83
Carr, were racially charged because the rural communities seeking
to retain representational hegemony were also in part warding off the
84
development of a minority presence in the urban political machines.
This is a common account, and even a glance at the table of contents
of the Law of Democracy casebook that I coauthor reveals the
tremendous weight of racial-justice cases in virtually all areas of law
85
regulating politics, save perhaps campaign finance.
Examined more closely, however, the cases differentiate
themselves across three primary dimensions. In the first instance are
challenges over basic access to the franchise beginning in the post–
Civil War era and continuing through the early phase of the Civil
Rights Movement. After the battle for women’s enfranchisement was
resolved by the Nineteenth Amendment, black exclusion from voting
through the legacy of Jim Crow became the dominant vehicle for the
86
development of an affirmative right of political participation. This
first generation of simple participation yielded the great efforts of the
VRA to suspend the operation of literacy tests and the like, and
impose the government filter of preclearance under Section 5 to

83. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
84. For a discussion of the role of the Memphis Democratic organization, including the
early African-American local leaders, in bringing the Baker litigation to the Supreme Court and
pushing the Kennedy administration to support their claim to equipopulational representation,
see Stephen Ansolabehere & Samuel Issacharoff, The Story of Baker v. Carr, in
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 271–94 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2d ed. 2004).
85. See generally THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 40.
86. Professor Lani Guinier first described this sequence as the first generation of voting
cases, followed by the second generation of representation claims, and the third generation of
effective-participation-in-governance claims. See Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The
Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1093–1126
(1991); see generally LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL
FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994) (discussing the development of votingrights litigation). Pam Karlan and I used slightly different concepts to characterize the same
point about the progression of claims from the simple act of participation in voting forward to
the capacity to elect candidates of choice to office. See generally Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized
Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH.
L. REV. 1833 (1992); Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights To Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism,
71 TEX. L. REV. 1705 (1993).
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prevent the reintroduction of any devices that might adversely affect
87
(“retrogress” ) the ability of minorities to vote.
The early efforts to foster political integration began with a
simple syllogism. Black voters were concentrated in the South; black
voters could not vote because of registration requirements and other
barriers, including outright intimidation and violence; so as a result,
no black candidates could get elected to office in the face of
88
determined white obstruction. Congress responded with federal
registrars capable of opening up the voter-registration process, and
89
with the removal of polling-place barriers though Section 5. Federal
intervention proved spectacularly successful as black-voter
90
participation rose dramatically. Today’s voting landscape is
unrecognizable. Indeed, the registration and participation figures for
black voters, for all practical purposes, are equivalent to those of
91
white voters.
With the restored enfranchisement of black voters, however,
came a series of structural obstacles that prevented black voting from
being translated into black officeholding. This second generation of
voting claims asserted that certain voting practices, primarily
multimember districts or at-large elections, magnified the voting
power of cohesive white majorities under conditions of racially
polarized voting. The Supreme Court began to recognize these vote92
dilution claims in the 1970s, and Congress unleashed a strong
statutory response to continued minority exclusion in the 1982
87. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976) (“In other words the purpose of § 5 has
always been to insure that no voting-procedure changes would be made that would lead to a
retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the
electoral franchise.”).
88. See generally QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT, 1965-1990 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994) [hereinafter
QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH] (discussing the state of affairs in the South before and
after the VRA).
89. Id.
90. See, e.g., Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2626 (2013) (documenting the early
successes of the VRA in general and Section 5 in particular).
91. THE DIVERSIFYING ELECTORATE—VOTING RATES BY RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN
IN 2012 (AND OTHER RECENT ELECTIONS) 2–4, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2013), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p20-568.pdf; see also Hope Yen, A Census First: Black
Voter Turnout Passes Whites, NBCNEWS.COM (May 8, 2013), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/
_news/2013/05/08/18131900-a-census-first-black-voter-turnout-passes-whites.
92. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 767 (1973) (sustaining a district court’s
finding that the city of Dallas’s use of multimember districts in primary elections prevented the
black community from “enter[ing] into the political process in a reliable and meaningful
manner”).
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amendments to Section 2. Subsequently, in the Shaw v. Reno line of
95
cases, the Supreme Court drew a constitutional line around the
extent to which Congress, DOJ, or state redistricting bodies could use
race-specific line drawing to enhance minority representation.
As with the first generation of voting-access cases, the results of
the second generation of election-to-office cases are stunning in terms
of obtaining minority representation. Getting minority candidates
into office, what is termed “descriptive representation,” was the
signature success of the second generation of voting-rights cases. To
take the simplest example, before the VRA, the number of African
Americans in Congress was always in the single digits; in the 112th
Congress, there were forty-three black representatives, a fairly
96
consistent number for the past ten years. With the exception of
single-office positions (such as senator or governor), minority
representation is well entrenched. Even in single-office positions,
minorities have made significant inroads by being elected as mayors
97
and even governors in nonminority majority cities and states, and,
98
most obviously, by being elected as President of the United States.
Finally, a third set of claims involved the ability to have an
effective voice in governance. In a simpler form, these cases

93. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2(a), 96 Stat. 131, 134
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2012)); see Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35
(1986) (noting that “Congress substantially revised § 2 to make clear that a violation could be
proved by showing discriminatory effect alone”). For a discussion of the transformative effect of
vote-dilution litigation, primarily under Section 2, see Chandler Davidson, The Recent Evolution
of Voting Rights Law Affecting Racial and Language Minorities, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE
SOUTH, supra note 88, at 21.
94. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
95. See, e.g., Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 258 (2001) (upholding the majority–
minority congressional districts created in North Carolina post-Shaw); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S.
952, 954 (1996) (plurality opinion) (applying strict scrutiny to strike down bizarrely shaped
majority–minority Texas congressional districts); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 912 (1995)
(holding that bizarre shape was not a threshold requirement of a claim of racial gerrymandering
under Shaw); Shaw, 509 U.S. at 642 (holding that plaintiffs’ allegation that North Carolina’s
redistricting legislation was “so extremely irregular on its face that it could rationally be viewed
only as an effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting, without regard to traditional
districting principles and without sufficiently compelling justification” was sufficient to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted under the federal Equal Protection Clause).
96. JENNIFER E. MANNING & COLLEEN J. SHOGAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30378,
AFRICAN AMERICAN MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS: 1870–2012, at 2 (2012).
97. See generally Major African American Office Holders Since 1641, BLACKPAST.ORG,
http://www.blackpast.org/aah/major-african-american-office-holders (last visited Mar. 10, 2015).
98. Adam Nagourney, Obama Elected President as Racial Barrier Falls, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
4, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/05/us/politics/05elect.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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demanded that newly elected black officeholders have the same
prerogatives of office as did their white predecessors. In the most
significant (and unsuccessful) such suit, a newly elected black county
commissioner challenged a requirement that the entire board of
commissioners approve the awarding of any county contract, which
left the lone black commissioner subject to being outvoted on
proposed expenditures. The prior system, on the other hand, had
allowed each commissioner to award contracts unilaterally in an
99
assigned geographical area.
Most notably, and most significantly for present purposes,
demands for a fair share of governmental power ran headlong into
the descriptive-representation objective of the second generation of
100
cases. In Georgia v. Ashcroft, a redistricting deal engineered by
black state legislators reduced the black population percentage of
black-majority districts so as to spread around more Democratic
101
votes. Under the then-conventional interpretation of Section 5, any
reduction in the percentage of the black voting-age population in a
102
black-majority district was presumed retrogressive and unlawful. If
the sole test for permissible redistricting under Section 5 were the
ability of minority voters to elect a candidate of their choice to office,
then perforce a reduction in the minority percentage of the district
would increase electoral vulnerability. The overall effectiveness of the
black vote might be enhanced by the ability to form coalitions with
white crossover voters, but the guarantee of minority representation
103
would be imperiled.
From the perspective of political power, however, taking a blackmajority district from 68 to 77 percent black was not a further
guarantee of black electoral success. Rather, it represented a
diminution of black electoral impact, as the additional black votes
were wasted in the overpacking of an already effective electoral bloc.
For Georgia Congressman John Lewis and the drafters of the
proposed Georgia redistricting plan, the excess black votes were also
critical Democratic votes. The drafters hoped that a more efficient
99. See Guinier, supra note 86, at 1144. For such a claim, see Presley v. Etowah Cnty.
Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491, 497 (1992).
100. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003).
101. Id. at 469.
102. See Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its Own
Success?, 140 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1717 (2004).
103. See Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now at War with Itself? Social Science and
Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1517, 1569 (2002).
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use of black votes would maintain Democratic control of the state
104
legislature, including committees chaired by black Democrats.
Because the plan diminished minority concentrations in favor of
a political gambit to maintain fleeting Democratic power at the
statewide level, it was necessarily suspect. In the first place, it drew
the ire of state Republicans, for whom efficiency in the use of
105
Democratic votes was, unsurprisingly, not a priority. But it also ran
afoul of the second generation of voting-rights cases, which had been
defined by the prospect of securing black and other minority
representation through a primary focus on safe minority districts. The
Republican concern and the traditional civil-rights orthodoxy came
together in a Republican-controlled DOJ, which objected to the
proposed redistricting on the grounds that it adversely affected
106
minority-voting prospects. In a flight of irony, Congressman Lewis’s
redistricting plan was ultimately upheld 5–4 in the Supreme Court in
Georgia v. Ashcroft, over the strong dissent of the four most-liberal
107
members of the Court.
The complicated breakdown in Georgia v. Ashcroft shows that
conceiving of this third phase of voting concern with real political
empowerment as being narrowly a matter of hiring and contracting
decisions misses the broader object of political power. Axiomatically,
minorities are minorities. In any electoral system, minorities will be at
risk of being overwhelmed by majority preferences so long as the axes
of political division are cast in terms that separate the majority from
the minority. Indeed, this was the logic of the second generation of
cases attacking at-large elections for compounding the inherent
108
majority advantage.
104. See Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 469–70 (quoting several black leaders who developed the plan
at issue); Pamela S. Karlan, Georgia v. Ashcroft and the Retrogression of Retrogression, 3
ELECTION L.J. 21, 24–26 (2004).
105. See Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 471 (noting that no Georgia Republicans voted for the plan);
Georgia Plan Gives Edge to Democrats, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2001), http://www.nytimes
.com/2001/09/30/us/georgia-plan-gives-the-edge-to-democrats.html (reporting that Republicans
“vowed to challenge the plan in federal court”).
106. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 472–73.
107. Id. The irony was that a Republican DOJ challenged the plan in terms of racial justice,
though the deal had been brokered by politician John Lewis, the hero of the civil-rights era.
Congress subsequently purported to overturn the ruling in the 2006 amendment of Section 5.
See Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization
and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577, as recognized in Shelby Cnty.
v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2621 (2013).
108. In any system with predictable cleavages, a 60–40 majority will win 100 percent of the
representation if there is a single election. If the electorate is subdivided in fair fashion, the
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Paradoxically, cohesive minorities should do better than their
percentage share of the electorate in any single-peaked electoral
arrangement if they can be the turnkey for the majority coalition. The
second generation of voting cases sought to establish a minority
presence in the halls of government, but as will be developed below,
they did so almost exclusively outside the context of divided partisan
power. Once minority representation took hold, and once the
formerly single-party Democratic South became a focal point for
partisan battles, the question of the tension between protections for
minority safe seats and a viable Democratic coalition came to the
fore. It is possible to present enclaves of minority power as a form of
109
federalist experiment in joint governance, but that view accepts a
cramped domain for minority political power at the margins of the
national playing field. Cases such as Georgia v. Ashcroft show that the
stakes are not about isolated enclaves of minority decisionmaking,
but rather about the realities of broad minority political power in a
freighted partisan environment. In like fashion, it is possible to cast
the current battles over the franchise using the terms of the first
generation of voting-rights activism in securing the baseline ability to
register and to vote. But in each circumstance, the partisanship adds a
complication that, as this Article will develop, compromises the
remedial effectiveness of the historic civil-rights approaches.
B. Voting Rights and Bipartisan Competition
The question of minority voting rights has never been altogether
separate from partisan politics. Black enfranchisement first occurred
under the Republican-controlled Reconstruction administration, and
the first wave of black elected officials from the South were uniformly
110
Republican, dedicated sons of the Party of Lincoln.
The
Redemption constitutions of the South, which were the source of the
voting-rights battles of the late twentieth century, were the product of
a Democratic recapture of political power. Everything—from poll
taxes, literacy tests, and grandfather clauses to the use of at-large
elections—was the product of an effort to consolidate white
Democratic power against the integrationist force known as
minority should obtain substantial representation. See Issacharoff, supra note 86, at 1860
(defending the VRA challenge as a Madisonian response to the risk of majority faction).
109. Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4,
60–71 (2010).
110. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION: 1863-1877,
at 281–307 (3d ed. 2002).
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“carpetbaggers.” Even then, claims of fraud and misuse of the
franchise abounded, perhaps with some justification in the heated
112
partisan environment of the late nineteenth-century South.
Undoubtedly, the focus of the Redemption period was on the
restoration of white power through the cradle-to-grave commands of
113
Jim Crow. Recently, however, more attention has been paid to the
complex political dynamics of the period, particularly to the overlay
between racial politics and broader political currents.
North Carolina provides a prime example. By the time of the
passage of its 1900 constitution, blacks were one-third of the North
114
Carolina population. In 1894, a Republican, Daniel Russell, was
elected governor by a coalition that also chose the majority of the
115
state legislature and sent a black representative to Congress. The
election prompted massive violence by the Red Shirts, a marauding
outfit linked to the Ku Klux Klan, and also a climate of intimidation

111. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. of 1901, art. VIII, §§ 178, 183–84, 194; ARK. CONST. of 1874,
amend. VIII; DEL. CONST. of 1897, art. V, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. VI, § 8; GA. CONST. of
1877, art. II, § 1; LA. CONST. of 1913, art. 197, §§ 3–5; LA. CONST. of 1913, art. 198; MISS.
CONST. of 1890, art. 12, §§ 241, 243; N.C. CONST. of 1876, art. VI, § 4 (amended 1900); S.C.
CONST. of 1895, art. 2, § 4; S.C. CONST. of 1895, art. 11, § 6; TENN. CONST. of 1870, art. IV, § 1;
TEX. CONST. of 1876, art. VI, § 2; TEX. CONST. of 1876, art. VII, § 3; VA. CONST. of 1902, art. II,
§§ 18, 20–21, 35; VA. CONST. of 1902, art. XIII, § 173. It was not only the southern states that
imposed constitutional restrictions on the franchise in a way that would now be considered
suspect. The California Constitution of 1879, for example, provided that “no native of China, no
idiot, no insane person . . . , and no person who shall not be able to read the Constitution in the
English language and write his or her name, shall ever exercise the privileges of an elector in
this State . . . .” CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. II, § 1. For a compendium of state constitutions of the
early twentieth century, see THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
AND ORGANIC LAWS OF THE TERRITORIES AND OTHER COLONIAL DEPENDENCIES OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Charles Kettleborough ed., 1918). For their disenfranchising
motive, see generally MICHAEL PERMAN, STRUGGLE FOR MASTERY: DISFRANCHISEMENT IN
THE SOUTH, 1888–1908 (2001).
112. FONER, supra note 110, at 384–85 (noting that corruption “thrived in the
Reconstruction South because of the specific circumstances of Republican rule”).
113. See generally C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1955)
(describing the structure of Jim Crow segregation).
114. UNIV. OF VA. LIBRARY, Historical Census Browser, http://mapserver.lib.virginia
.edu/php/start.php?year=V1900 (last visited Mar. 10, 2015) (using the variables of “total
population,” “negro males,” and “negro females”); STATE DEMOCRATIC EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE OF NORTH CAROLINA, THE DEMOCRATIC HAND BOOK 1898, at 37, available at
http://docsouth.unc.edu/nc/dem1898/dem1898.html (“The population of North Carolina is
divided into two races—the white and black. About two-thirds of the entire population are
white, and about one-third is black.”).
115. See The Election of 1898 in North Carolina: An Introduction, UNIV. OF N.C.
LIBRARIES, http://exhibits.lib.unc.edu/exhibits/show/1898/history (last visited Mar. 10, 2015)
(discussing the “fusion” ticket).
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and fraud, leading to a white Democratic recapture of the state
116
legislature in 1898. North Carolina’s formal adoption of Jim Crow
by a narrow margin in 1900 was not simply an act of racism; it was, as
117
Professor Richard Pildes has described, a political defeat of
Piedmont populism and interracial politics at the hands of a highly
partisan vision of white Democratic politics. Similar battles raged for
118
decades throughout the South. In Texas’s White Primary Cases, for
example, blacks were excluded from the vote because of the white
population’s fear that they would provide the tie-breaking votes in
the longstanding battle between range populists and the conservative
119
gentry.
Redemption and Jim Crow are a complicated tale of the
reassertion of white Democratic control against the Republican
Party’s efforts to maximize black representation, and against an
incipient biracial populism that, as in North Carolina, had gained
significant traction. That history of biracial populist activism was
somewhat obscured by the time the Civil Rights Movement mobilized
after World War II. For as long as the South was both formally under
Jim Crow and solidly Democratic, the partisan considerations and
partisan legacy of black exclusion were obscured. Race was a sure
enough proxy for the manner in which control over voting cemented
one party’s rule, just as the South was a convenient enough proxy for
the dominion of racialist exclusion. Black voting rights were
antithetical to the Jim Crow status quo, but for more than one reason.
Most evidently, the prospect of the black franchise was a deep threat
to white supremacy, and the elimination of the black franchise was
the central organizing principle of early twentieth-century

116. See H. Leon Prather, Sr., We Have Taken a City: A Centennial Essay, in DEMOCRACY
BETRAYED: THE WILMINGTON RACE RIOT OF 1898 AND ITS LEGACY 15 (Timothy B. Tyson &
David S. Cecelski eds., 1998); see also, e.g., White Men Show Determination To Rid Themselves
of Negro Rule, MORNING STAR (Nov. 2, 1898), http://exhibits.lib.unc.edu/exhibits/show/
1898/item/2161 (reproducing a newspaper article from Wilmington, North Carolina, lauding a
“masterly speech” at a Red Shirt rally advocating that “if a negro constable [comes] to a white
man with a warrant in his hand he [leaves] with a bullet in his brain,” and favorably reporting
that “[m]any negros have taken their names from the registration list”).
117. Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17 CONST. COMMENT.
295, 314 (2000).
118. See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lock-Ups of
the Political Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 652–68 (1998) (discussing the White Primary Cases).
119. For an account of the role of black exclusion in cementing conservative control of the
Democratic Party, see id. at 653.
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120

constitutional reforms. But even beyond the South, claims to racial
justice also threatened the fragile fault lines of the ruling Democratic
coalition. Professor Ira Katznelson’s new work on the New Deal
informs once again the strange mix of protectionism, social populism,
and deep racism that merged uncomfortably in the southern
Democratic Party, and then infused a corresponding tension on the
121
national Democratic Party’s reliance on the Dixiecrats.
The white-Democratic stranglehold on the South also obscured
any immediate partisan implications of the incipient voting-rights
struggles. In retrospect, this is most clearly observable with regard to
the second-generation claims for equality of representational
opportunity. As played out in the courts, particularly in the aftermath
of the 1982 amendments to Section 2 and the Supreme Court’s
122
recasting of the VRA in Thornburg v. Gingles, vote-dilution claims
turned primarily on proof of racially polarized voting between a
cohesive white majority and a sizeable black minority. Proof consisted
of a crude but powerful bivariate regression model that showed, in
jurisdiction after jurisdiction, that the white vote correlated with the
candidates prevailing in heavily white precincts, and that the black
vote correlated with the candidates preferred in heavily black
123
precincts. These correlations established that, but for the at-large
system of elections, blacks could have constituted a majority in a
district that would have elected a representative of their choice to
124
office.
Whether presenting constitutional or statutory claims, these
vote-dilution cases resulted in the dismantling of multimember
electoral districts around the country. The result was the election of
minorities to all levels of state and local office, often for the first time
since Reconstruction. Paradoxically, the other beneficiary was the
Republican Party, which was also able to start electing candidates to

120. See THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 40, at 107–19 (giving examples of race as an
animating feature of Alabama electoral reforms).
121. See IRA KATZNELSON, FEAR ITSELF: THE NEW DEAL AND THE ORIGINS OF OUR
TIME 29–58 (2013).
122. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
123. See id. at 52–74 (upholding this analysis for vote-dilution claims); Issacharoff, supra
note 86, at 1850–53.
124. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47–50 (describing these necessary conditions for claims of vote
dilution).
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office, initially as a minority political party. For the Republicans, this
125
was often the first electoral toehold since Reconstruction.
Almost unmentioned in the VRA is the tremendous partisan
realignment that occurred after the Civil Rights Movement. Although
not an intended beneficiary of the Civil Rights Movement, the
southern Republican party rose to dominance, first able to vie for
office in smaller districts and then able to play on white fear and
resentment over black political gains. In the North, perhaps
paradoxically, the urban Democratic Party—which had long been
marked by ethnic ward politics and generous patronage—proved
more permeable to a new black political machine. The national
Democratic Party, though long a bastion of the Dixiecrats, became
the party of President Truman’s integration of the military, of
President Kennedy’s eloquent attacks on Jim Crow, and of President
126
Johnson’s civil-rights legislation and Great Society programs.
Simply put, the black vote became the black Democratic vote; no
modern political analysis can escape this fact. It is not simply that
blacks consistently vote over 90 percent for Democratic candidates.
As Professor Randall Kennedy well argues, for all of the Obama
campaign’s appeals to a broad constituency, the decisive push that
propelled President Obama to victory in 2008 came from a massive
127
black turnout —a pattern that was repeated in 2012.
From the beginning of the vote-dilution case law, however,
partisan competition was excluded from consideration. Just as the
Supreme Court had to stretch to find state action when the Texas
Democratic Party was the only game in town in the White Primary
128
Cases, so too did the Supreme Court’s description of the wrong in
vote-dilution cases steer clear of any role for political parties
competing for minority votes. Indeed, many of the factors of the votedilution inquiry that the Court identified early on would make little
sense in the context of active political competition. The Court’s

125. Peter Applebome, Rising G.O.P. Tide Overwhelms the Democratic Levees in the South,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/11/us/1994-elections-south-risinggop-tide-overwhelms-democratic-levees-south.html (noting that congressional redistricting in
the early 1990s “helped both blacks and Republicans”).
126. See Merle Black, The Transformation of the Southern Democratic Party, 66 J. POL.
1001, 1007–12 (2004) (discussing this shift in Democratic Party membership, specifically in the
South).
127. RANDALL KENNEDY, THE PERSISTENCE OF THE COLOR LINE: RACIAL POLITICS AND
THE OBAMA PRESIDENCY 66–105 (2011).
128. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 118, at 652–60.
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attention to the slating of candidates by a unified set of political
129
bosses, for example, was used to test for monopolistic control of the
electoral process, something that would dissipate in the context of
meaningful electoral contestation.
Almost without fail, the cases establishing vote dilution could not
grapple with bipartisan competition. The secret undercurrent of the
political-exclusion cases is that they addressed only claims of
exclusive Democratic control of southern jurisdictions or urban
northern settings. In part, the exclusive focus on political contests in a
one-party dominated jurisdiction was a methodological question, as
the presence of party-line voting complicated the use of a simple
regression model that looked at race and votes cast as the only
130
variables. More significantly, once there were two parties involved,
the racial dimensions of a candidate’s loss fell out of focus.
131
One of the first vote-dilution cases, Whitcomb v. Chavis, set the
stage for decades of subsequent difficulties addressing the entangled
issues of race and politics. In Whitcomb, the constitutional claim was
that multimember state legislative districts defeated the electoral
prospects of what the Court described as “a racial minority group
132
[that] inhabited an identifiable ghetto area in Indianapolis.” On the
facts presented, the inner-city black voters supported the Democratic
Party, but the broader voting community elected Republicans to
133
office. For the Court, “the failure of the ghetto to have legislative
seats in proportion to its population emerge[d] more as a function of
134
losing elections than of built-in bias against poor Negroes.” More
135
bluntly, “As our system has it, one candidate wins, the others lose.”

129. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 767 (1973); Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1303
(5th Cir. 1973).
130. See Cousin v. Sundquist, 145 F.3d 818, 825 (6th Cir. 1998); Sanchez v. Colorado, 97 F.3d
1303, 1317 n.25 (10th Cir. 1996); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d
831, 884 (5th Cir. 1993); Black Political Task Force v. Galvin, 300 F. Supp. 2d 291, 305–06 (D.
Mass. 2004); Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 478 (E.D. Tex. 2004); Anthony v. Michigan,
35 F. Supp. 2d 989, 1009 app. tbl. IV (E.D. Mich. 1999); Brown v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 722 F. Supp.
380, 392 (E.D. Tenn. 1989); Bradford Cnty. NAACP v. City of Starke, 712 F. Supp. 1523, 1534
(M.D. Fla. 1989); Windy Boy v. Big Horn Cnty., 647 F. Supp. 1002, 1009–10 (D. Mont. 1986).
131. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
132. Id. at 131.
133. Id. at 152.
134. Id. at 153.
135. Id.
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Being outvoted could not justify a claim for relief unless there was
136
proof of “being denied access to the political system.”
Whitcomb refused an invitation to find Republican electoral
success unconstitutional, even in the face of black voting allegiance to
the Democratic Party—a result that seems constitutionally inevitable.
But Whitcomb also refused to address the proper distribution of
electoral results along racial lines, as well as among any of the
137
constituent groups of pluralist politics. Justice O’Connor’s difficult
concurrence in Thornburg v. Gingles resurrected the concern of
Whitcomb, and left open the possibility that a court should consider
138
“all other relevant factors” affecting minority political opportunity.
When the focus of representation shifted from at-large elections
to the redistricting of single-constituency seats, the representational
issue could no longer be avoided. Nor did the emergent Republican
Party in the South allow the Court the ability to address minority
exclusion without partisan implications. North Carolina’s
constitutional redistricting cases, beginning with Shaw v. Reno,
presented the Court with bizarre district lines seemingly shouting out
139
racial entitlement. For the majority of the Justices, particularly
Justice O’Connor, this redistricting scheme was simply a line too far,
140
a point at which “appearances do matter.”
The expressive
141
dimension of overt state commitment to racial considerations
framed the Court’s inquiry and the ensuing prohibition on states’
142
exclusive reliance on racial considerations in redistricting.
Unaddressed by the Court was the fact that both in North
Carolina and nationally, black votes were Democratic votes, and the
underlying redistricting battles had a clear partisan cast. To begin
with, North Carolina Democrats had tried to redistrict in a fashion

136. Id. at 154.
137. See id. at 156 (asking about the representation for, inter alia, union members, university
groups, and religious and ethnic groups).
138. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 99 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
139. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing
Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588, 610 (1993) (“When the
gerrymander has a visible racial component, the Court implicitly reasons, the districting decision
flashes the message: ‘RACE, RACE, RACE.’”).
140. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993).
141. See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV.
483, 506–16 (1993) (describing the “expressive harms” that the Shaw Court recognized).
142. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 957–58 (1996) (describing this harm and providing the
framework for judicial review of Shaw claims).
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that would allow greater black representation while leaving intact the
electoral bases of the incumbent congressional delegation, including
its rich set of seniority privileges. That effort prompted an objection
from the Republican-led DOJ, with the anticipated effect of breaking
143
up historic Democratic power bases. Instead, the Democratic
legislature “scrimshawed” black districts, to use the late Professor
144
John Hart Ely’s evocative Melvillean term, attempting both to
create black descriptive representation and to preserve Democratic
control over these districts. Only after an entire decade and four trips
to the Supreme Court did a sheepish Court discover as an
“evidentiary” matter that “race in this case correlates closely with
political behavior,” and that the record could not disentangle the
145
two.
No more successful than the attempt to find a line between racial
and partisan considerations is the case law engaging the numerical
distribution of black votes to maximize partisan impact. In cases like
Georgia v. Ashcroft, the protector of black political aspirations was
the Republican-controlled DOJ, which found that greater
concentration of black voting strength (and corresponding weakening
146
of Democratic voting power) was required under Section 5.
Alternatively, in Page v. Bartels, Republican litigants in New Jersey
challenged a Democratic gerrymander of the state on the grounds
that the efficient spreading of Democratic votes resulted in minority147
vote dilution in violation of Section 2. Not surprisingly in light of the
partisan interests at play, in the last throes of Section 5 prior to Shelby
County, it was the Republican legislature of Alabama that read the
nonretrogression standard of the VRA most aggressively as requiring
148
(or at least permitting) the packing of black (Democratic) voters—a

143. See Ronald Smothers, Fairness or Racial Gerrymander? Justices Study “Serpentine”
District, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1993, at B7 (detailing the political maneuvering that led to the
district lines at issue).
144. John Hart Ely, Confounded by Cromartie: Are Racial Stereotypes Now Acceptable
Across the Board or Only When Used in Support of Partisan Gerrymanders?, 56 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 489, 492 (2002).
145. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 257 (2001).
146. See Issacharoff, supra note 102, at 1717 (“[I]t would be an irony of historic proportions
if the VRA were to emerge as a brake on black political aspirations in the heart of the Deep
South.”).
147. Page v. Bartels, 144 F. Supp. 2d 346, 348 (D.N.J. 2001). For a comparison of Georgia
and New Jersey in this respect, see generally Issacharoff, supra note 102.
148. “Packing” is a term of art in redistricting parlance, referring to the overconcentration
of voters beyond that necessary to elect. See Pamela S. Karlan, All over the Map: The Supreme
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reading of the VRA that has been resisted in the Supreme Court by
149
the Alabama Democratic Party and various civil-rights groups.
Even in the most recent Term of the Supreme Court, the overlay
between partisan considerations and traditional civil-rights
protections has confounded attempts to regulate improper behavior
through a simple discrimination model.
IV. VOTE DENIAL IN AN ERA OF PARTISAN COMPETITION
A. Complications in the Voting-Rights Model
As the VRA aged, the gap between its regulatory structure and
the issues of the day grew. After the early onslaught against pervasive
at-large electoral systems across the country, Section 2 diminished in
150
its litigation centrality. Similarly, the number of DOJ objections
denying preclearance under Section 5 plummeted, raising questions
151
about its continued relevance. By the time the Court reengaged
with the constitutionality of Section 5 in Shelby County, the majority
and dissent parted ways on whether there was any longer a factual
152
predicate for coverage under the VRA. For the majority, the lack of

Court’s Voting Rights Trilogy, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 250 (referring to “packing,” “stacking,”
and “cracking” as the tools of vote dilution).
149. See Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1239 (M.D. Ala.
2013) (noting Alabama’s argument that it “preserved the majority-black districts with roughly
the same percentage of black voters to comply with the nonretrogression principle of section 5
of the Voting Rights Act”); see also Brief for Appellants at 25–36, Ala. Legislative Black
Caucus, 134 S. Ct. 2695, No. 13-1138 (Aug. 13, 2014) (arguing that Section 5 does not require
black-population percentages, or “BPPs”); Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense &
Educational Fund, Inc., in Support of Appellants at 12–16, Ala. Legislative Black Caucus, 134 S.
Ct. 2695 Nos. 13-895, 13-1138 (Aug. 20, 2014) (arguing that Section 5 does not require
maintaining a “specific minority population percentage in majority-minority districts”); Brief of
the Brennan Center for Justice at N.Y.U. School of Law as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Appellants at 4–9, Ala. Legislative Black Caucus, 134 S. Ct. 2695, Nos. 13-895, 13-1138 (Aug. 20,
2014) (arguing that racial quotas under Section 5 are “constitutionally suspect”).
150. See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 13–14 (2008) (describing this decline in Section 2 claims).
151. See Peyton McCrary, How the Voting Rights Act Works: Implementation of a Civil
Rights Policy, 1965-2005, 57 S.C. L. REV. 785, 821 (2006) (discussing this decline in Section 5
claims).
152. See Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power To Renew the Preclearance Provisions of
the Voting Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 188–93 (2005) (outlining
the difficulty of providing evidentiary support for the preclearance provisions when renewing
the VRA).
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objections was an indication that the VRA had run its course.
Meanwhile, for the dissent, “Throwing out preclearance when [the
VRA] has worked and is continuing to work to stop discriminatory
changes is like throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm because
154
you are not getting wet.”
Neither of the central provisions of the VRA fits the current
circumstances particularly well. Section 5 is most concerned with the
actual mechanics of voting, but its extraordinary administrative
review of state regulations was applied only to limited parts of the
155
country. Even when in force, Section 5 would not have covered
efforts to diminish voting opportunities in Ohio, Pennsylvania, or
Wisconsin. Moreover, Section 5’s effectiveness hinged on the
reluctance of jurisdictions to risk administrative rejection by DOJ.
That reluctance was increasingly overcome in the later years of
Section 5, meaning that the primary effect of the VRA was to switch
the burden of proof onto a jurisdiction that failed to secure
preclearance from DOJ.
Section 2 is an even poorer fit. The legislative history of the
VRA’s 1982 amendments reflects the genesis of the modern VRA as
an attempt to create an easier path for vote-dilution cases than that
compelled under the constitutional standard of City of Mobile v.
156
Bolden. As interpreted in Thornburg v. Gingles, the purpose of
Section 2 is to weigh the legitimacy of the electoral results that obtain
157
from how the votes are tabulated, not whether they were cast
properly in the first place, or were somehow subject to improper
impediments. Since 1982, there has been little effort to address voting
access through Section 2, and Section 2’s use in this area is currently a
158
matter of dispute in district courts. For example, courts in Ohio and

153. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2626 (2013) (calling it “illuminating” that “[i]n
the last decade before reenactment, the Attorney General objected to a mere 0.16 percent” of
proposed changes in covered jurisdictions).
154. Id. at 2650 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
155. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 51, app. (2012) (listing the covered jurisdictions).
156. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980) (noting that facially neutral state
action must have a discriminatory purpose to violate the Fifteenth Amendment).
157. See generally JAMES A. GARDNER, WHAT ARE CAMPAIGNS FOR? THE ROLE OF
PERSUASION IN ELECTORAL LAW AND POLITICS (2009) (describing the tabulation function of
elections).
158. See Ohio State Conference of NAACP v. Husted, No. 2:14-CV-404, 2014 WL 4377869,
at *1 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 4, 2014) (granting the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction),
aff’d, 768 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 2014), staying order, 135 S. Ct. 42 (2014).
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Wisconsin found sufficiently adverse racial impact so as to render
voter-ID laws improper, but a North Carolina court reached the
160
opposite conclusion over similar voting requirements.
The question of the day is whether the traditional civil-rights
models can and should be amended to try to recapture the primary
regulatory means to contest improper ballot restrictions. The prior
redistricting cases indicate that even before the latest Supreme Court
rulings, the introduction of partisanship was already a complicating
161
factor in even commonly litigated areas of voting-rights law. Nor is
recourse to direct constitutional claims of discrimination likely to be
availing. Professor Daniel Tokaji captures the modern dynamic:
“While intentional discrimination is difficult to establish, existing
evidence supports the conclusion that identification requirements,
outdated voting equipment, and felon disenfranchisement laws bear
162
most heavily on African American and Latino voters.”
Even if one could craft a purely effects-based statutory test,
something that might run afoul of the congruence-and163
proportionality standard of City of Boerne v. Flores, many of the
current restrictions on registration and ballot access are difficult to
assess in terms of likely racial impact. Take, for example, North
Carolina’s recent revocation of a state-law provision allowing
seventeen-year-old high-school students to preregister for voter
eligibility through their schools and be added automatically to the
164
rolls once they turn eighteen. A challenge based on racial impact
would have to show not only differential registration rates along
black–white grounds, but also a difference in the use of alternative
registration mechanisms, and an ultimate impact not only on voter
159. See Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 900 (E.D. Wis. 2014) (holding that the balance
of harms weighed against issuing a stay pending appeal), rev’d, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014).
160. See N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d 322, 384 (M.D.N.C.
2014), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded sub nom. League of Women Voters of N.C. v.
North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224 (4th Cir. 2014), staying order, 135 S. Ct. 6 (2014); see also MORITZ
COLL. OF LAW, supra note 82. See generally Weiser & Opsal, supra note 29 (listing principal
litigation).
161. See, e.g., Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441, 446 (1974)
(invalidating a loyalty-oath rule designed to exclude the Communist Party from organized
politics).
162. Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights
Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689, 701 (2006).
163. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997) (“[T]here must be a congruence
between the means used and the ends to be achieved. The appropriateness of remedial
measures must be considered in light of the evil presented.”).
164. N.C. State Conference of NAACP, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 378–79.
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registration, but presumably on the ability of minority voters to elect
a candidate of their choice to office. Perhaps not surprisingly, on first
review, a North Carolina district court upheld the state’s reforms
165
against challenges under the voting-rights laws. At the end of the
day, and perhaps not surprisingly, voting-rights models intended to
ferret out racial motivation or differential electoral impact based on
race translate poorly to a setting in which issues of race overlap with
considerations of partisanship—perhaps inextricably so.
B. A Law of Democracy Through the Prism of Race
When the first edition of The Law of Democracy appeared in
1998, one striking feature was the centrality of Alabama in so many of
the cases that defined the field. It was as if, the authors joked amongst
themselves, the field could be called the Law of Alabama. The star
turn for Alabama was no accident. The original design of the federal
166
Constitution contained a Faustian bargain over slavery. The federal
government, and by extension federal constitutional commitments,
were conspicuously removed from the internal political arrangements
of the states. One reflection of the compromise leading to the drafting
and ratification of the Constitution is that the original document did
167
not embody a textual commitment to democracy. Some democratic
principles are implicated by the required regular rotation of elected
officials. There are also some antimonarchical concepts carried
168
through the Guarantee Clause.
But there was no textual
identification of the structures of democratic politics, nor of how the
internal electoral affairs of the states were to be conducted. As a
corollary, control over political participation and the structure of
165. See id. at 370 (finding that the denial of a preliminary injunction preventing this law
from taking effect would not irreparably harm the plaintiffs).
166. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2264 (2013) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (“Even if the convention had been able to agree on a uniform federal standard [for
voting qualifications], the Framers knew that state ratification conventions likely would have
rejected it. Madison explained that ‘reduc[ing] the different qualifications in the different States
to one uniform rule would probably have been as dissatisfactory to some of the States as it
would have been difficult to the convention.’ Justice Story elaborated that setting voter
qualifications in the Constitution could have jeopardized ratification, because it would have
been difficult to convince States to give up their right to set voting qualifications.” (citations
omitted)).
167. See generally THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 40, at 7–10 (discussing the origins
of the constitutional text).
168. For an expansive reading of the Republican Guarantee Clause, see generally Michael
W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Current Consequences, 24 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103 (2000).
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elections was left to local authorities. Alabama achieved the role of
innovator because it used its powers of local control to drive the
politics of racial exclusion.
Race bore the burden of creating a law of democracy in the
United States for two reasons—one obvious, one perhaps less so.
First, because the Reconstruction Amendments established
citizenship and voting rights based on race, there was a more
accessible legal basis for a claim of a denial of fundamental
democratic rights. Race provided the opening wedge into cohering a
broader national commitment to political rights. But much more
significant was the role of race in defining the contours of a
constitutional law of the political process that began to emerge in the
mid–twentieth century. Race so heavily infused every contested area
of constitutional politics, again save perhaps the emergence of
campaign-finance law, that it provided a certain enough proxy for the
emerging constitutional law of political engagement. Once the
Nineteenth Amendment’s passage in 1920 definitively settled the
issue of women’s voting rights, the continued force of Jim Crow was
the crucible for judicial engagement with the political process.
But Bush v. Gore dramatically revealed that the fault lines in the
politics of voting were shifting. After the notable successes of the
VRA interventions, the center of gravity of the VRA shifted from
states with remaining legacies of Jim Crow to states like Florida and
Ohio that were becoming the dividing lines in the partisan wars.
These are states that, although no doubt having minority populations,
are tightly divided between Democratic and Republican voters, and
that offer a rich harvest of power for tipping voting margins for
control in all areas, from state legislative power to blocs of votes in
the Electoral College. To concretize the transformed electoral
environment, today’s shorthand description of the law of democracy
is more likely to be the law of Ohio than the law of Alabama.
What defines modern case law is the toxic combination of local
political control over the election machinery and national political
169
impact in terms of either congressional redistricting or Electoral
169. There is a longstanding dispute over whether gerrymandered redistricting is a result of
partisan imbalance and greater partisan rancor, or whether the blue–red divide is instead a
product of the “big sort” of like-minded communities gravitating closer toward each other, with
Democrats in the urban areas and Republicans in the suburban and rural areas. Although the
sorting effect is no doubt present, the revealed belief of political insiders is that authority over
redistricting matters greatly. Consider, for example, Pennsylvania’s voting results in 2008 and
2012 under redistricting plans drawn first by Democrats and then by Republicans. Though
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College votes. The pattern is the same regardless of the racial
composition of the state, or whether the state has a Jim Crow lineage.
The forms of voter restrictions look different in a formerly covered
Section 5 jurisdiction like Texas, in a partially covered one like North
Carolina, or in a noncovered jurisdiction like Wisconsin. The tools of
limitation focusing on the ID requirement for voting are the same in a
state with a large minority population, like Mississippi, and in one
with a small minority population, like New Hampshire. Similarly,
newly imposed restrictions on early voting and on ease of registration
are basically the same in a state with a mobilized minority electorate,
170
like Ohio, and in one without such an electorate, like Nebraska.
Indeed, one of the lead innovators on restrictive voter practices is
Kansas, a state with a relatively small minority population.
To repeat the main point, what unifies those states creating new
ballot restrictions is that they are under Republican control, and what
separates those states from jurisdictions that have resisted the tide of
new constraints is that the latter are under Democratic control.
Today’s “ballot bedlam” is a reflection of the importance of turnout
in a fraught partisan environment.
At bottom, the issue is whether it is time to address the new
voting claims in their partisan guise, rather than continue to
repackage voting practices based on the racial impact of select
jurisdictions. As Justice Stevens wrote for the Crawford Court, “If
[partisan] considerations had provided the only justification for a
photo identification requirement, we may also assume that [such a
law] would suffer the same fate as the poll tax at issue in Harper [v.
171
Virginia Board of Elections].”
But partisanship is rarely so
unvarnished as to stand alone, as Justice Stevens seems to require. At
the same time, the main argument of this Article is that we should
resist the efforts to fill the void by placing all doctrinal weight on
claims of racial discrimination. Three developments suggest that the
President Obama won the state handily each time with about 55 percent of the vote, his voting
margins were almost entirely concentrated in Philadelphia, giving some support to the sorting
thesis. In 2008, Democrats took twelve of the state’s nineteen House seats. In 2012, after a
Republican-run redistricting and after the loss of one congressional seat from reapportionment,
the Democrats won only five of the state’s eighteen seats. Absent a renewed sorting through
massive population transfer during these four years, the only variable accounting for which
party controlled the congressional delegation seems to be which party controlled the
redistricting plans.
170. See supra Table 2.
171. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 203 (2008). Harper can be found
at Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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historical doctrinal reliance on race to police the political system
should yield to a direct focus on the integrity of the electoral system.
First, as developed above, the category of race increasingly fails
to capture the primary motivation for what has become a battlefield
in partisan wars. The efforts to use voter access as a partisan lever are
as likely to emerge in states with and without significant minority
populations. The fact that even minority impact is at best speculative
introduces real problems in using class forms of civil-rights
enforcement. Coupled with this is the weakness in the civil-rights
model following Shelby County, and the problematic efforts to force
vote-denial claims into the vote-dilution structure of Section 2.
Second, as the center of gravity in voting claims shifted to the
frontlines of the partisan battles, so too did the doctrines toward
nonracially defined constitutional protections. Ohio became ground
zero for the presidential elections of 2004, 2008 and 2012. In repeated
cases in the Sixth Circuit, where the partisan stakes raised the issue of
partisan manipulation of voting rules most aggressively in the political
and judicial arenas, a new constitutional doctrine emerged requiring
172
“the nonarbitrary treatment of voters.” From this, the Sixth Circuit
established a new test for equal protection of the franchise: “[S]tate
actions in election processes must not result in ‘arbitrary and
173
disparate treatment’ of votes.” In each case, the Sixth Circuit relied
on the language from Bush v. Gore that the right to the franchise
entails “more than the initial allocation of the franchise. Equal
174
protection applies as well to the manner of its exercise.” Applied to
eve-of-election alterations in early voting in Ohio in 2012, the Sixth
Circuit explained that
[a]lthough states are permitted broad discretion in devising the
election scheme that fits best with the perceived needs of the state,
and there is no abstract constitutional right to vote by absentee
ballot, eleventh-hour changes to remedial voting provisions that
have been in effect since 2005 and have been relied on by substantial
numbers of voters for the exercise of their franchise are properly

172. Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 635 F.3d 219, 234 (6th Cir. 2011) (quotation
marks omitted) (quoting League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Brunner, 548 F.3d 463, 477 (6th
Cir. 2008)).
173. Id. (quoting Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000)).
174. Bush, 531 U.S. at 104 (emphasis added).
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considered as a burden . . . . To conclude otherwise is to ignore
175
reality.

Third, alongside the constriction of federal civil-rights power in
Shelby County, the Court employs an expansive reading of the federal
regulatory power over federal elections. The Elections Clause of the
Constitution gives Congress plenary authority to override state
regulations with regard to the time, place, and manner of federal
176
congressional elections. As summarized by Judge Richard Posner,
when acting under the Elections Clause, “Congress was given the
177
178
whip hand.” In Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc.,
the Court confronted an Arizona requirement of proof of citizenship
as a condition of voting—in itself perfectly permissible, but put into
force by a modification of the federal forms used for registration in
179
federal elections. In striking down the Arizona law, Justice Scalia
brushed aside the federalism concerns underlying Shelby County,
ruling that “all action under the Elections Clause displaces some
element of a pre-existing state regulatory regime, because the text of
180
the Clause confers the power to do exactly (and only) that.”
In sum, the combination of the diminishing explanatory force of
race as the critical motivation of the new laws, the emergence of a
constitutional jurisprudence on a nondiscrimination account of the
right to vote, and the prospect of federal regulatory power being
exercised on the basis of control over federal elections all point to a
pivot away from the inherited civil-rights approaches. I have
elsewhere developed an argument about what a federal
181
administrative regime might entail, and I will not describe here the
institutional form that a federalized guarantee of electoral integrity
might take. But the key question for the present discussion is whether

175. Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 442 (6th Cir. 2012) (White, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 497 (2012). Disclosure: I served as one of the
lawyers for Obama for America in this litigation.
176. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
177. Ass’n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now (ACORN) v. Edgar, 56 F.3d 791, 794 (7th Cir.
1995).
178. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., 133 S. Ct. 2247 (2013).
179. Id. at 2252.
180. Id. at 2257 n.6.
181. See generally Samuel Issacharoff, Beyond the Discrimination Model on Voting, 127
HARV. L. REV. 95 (2013) (proposing an administrative process founded on the Elections
Clause).
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continuing to envision the inherited civil-rights model as the unique
regulatory framework continues to be effective.
CONCLUSION:
THE PARTICULAR AND THE UNIVERSAL
Twenty years ago, I began my first substantial article in this area
by asking why the facilitation of black-voter registration and black
182
voting had not made voting-rights litigation obsolete. Ten years ago,
I began a different article by asking, in similar fashion, whether
Section 5’s ability to enable black electoral advances had made the
continued vitality of that provision of the VRA a victim of its own
183
success.
In 1992, I could argue that the incomplete second phase of
voting-rights reform had left minorities still outside the legislative
184
arena. In the language of United States v. Carolene Products, Co.,
there was no capacity to turn to the ordinary workings of the political
process to redress the debilities of discrete and insular minorities who
were still unable to form part of the governing calculus in American
185
politics. But by 2004, the example of Georgia v. Ashcroft reflected
the changed dynamics of political success. Electoral success allowed
186
minorities to “pull, haul, and trade” in politics,
and in the
accompanying compromises, pacts, and coalitions that come from the
187
real world of politics.
The Supreme Court’s constitutional
confrontation with the VRA’s legacy in Shelby County forces these
debates to the fore once again.
Shelby County compels a reevaluation of the extent to which the
particularized protections of the right to vote through the paradigm of
racial exclusion and racial oppression continue to shape
contemporary battles of access to the ballot. Beyond the racial
dimensions, the history of racial exclusion from the franchise has
always had a strong component of maintaining incumbent political
182. See generally Issacharoff, supra note 86 (questioning why voting-rights litigation is not
obsolete and arguing that the insulation of voting-rights law from neoconservatives is a species
of affirmative action).
183. See generally Issacharoff, supra note 102 (asking whether the success of Section 5 has
compromised its mission).
184. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
185. Id. at 153 n.4.
186. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994).
187. See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Groups, Politics, and the Equal Protection
Clause, 58 U. MIAMI. L. REV. 35, 50 (2003) (interpreting the VRA’s results).
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power. But race bore the burden of much of the law of democracy,
and with this burden, it provided a basis for the transformation of the
constitutional protections of basic democratic rights. Undoubtedly,
race in American history has been a dominant theme in defining the
just protections of our society, and the twentieth-century fight for
racial justice in politics carried with it other dimensions for redressing
structural frailties in American democracy. But history has altered the
mix, and as wisely observed by Dean David F. Levi in his prior role as
a judge, “The history of election law is one of change and
188
adaptation.”
Focusing on the dominant partisan motivation for the
manipulation of ballot access suggests that we have reached a point at
which we can provide a strong measure of racial justice through
means not burdened with the particular legal and political freight of
race. Claims of racial justice have historically served as the primary—
and oftentimes exclusive—means of assailing the misuse of authority
over the political process, whether for racial or other ends. The
weakening of protections for the right to vote under the civil-rights
laws comes at the same time as a restored constitutional interest in
voting and political integrity, as well as a reaffirmation of muscular
federal authority over all voting in federal elections. Just as the racial
impact of the new voting restrictions is a byproduct of partisaninspired efforts to manipulate ballot access, so too may it be protected
as a broader recasting of the protections of the electoral system from
local partisan abuse.
The push to seek generalized protections for electoral integrity
rather than particular protection for vulnerable groups is part of a
much broader debate over whether more general structural
approaches capture enough of the distinct interests of the more
189
vulnerable groups in our society. Credible critics like Professors
190
191
Spencer Overton and Samuel Bagenstos urge the contrary, fearing
that—like Justice Ginsburg in Shelby County—a lowering of the
guard will reveal the unique vulnerabilities still borne by minorities.
But the changed legal and political dynamics suggest that it is time for
188. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 984 F. Supp. 1288, 1303 (E.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d, 169 F.3d
646 (9th Cir. 1998), rev’d, 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
189. For a similar claim about generalizing the protections of equal-protection law, see
generally Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747 (2011).
190. Spencer Overton, Voting Rights Disclosure, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 19, 23 (2013).
191. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Universalism and Civil Rights (with Notes on Voting Rights After
Shelby), 123 YALE L.J. 2838, 2870 (2014).
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the law of democracy to recognize that we really are in the era of the
law of Ohio. And with the question so posed, battleground states like
North Carolina look very much like the Ohio of today, and not so
much like the Alabama of old.

